Knowledge that Transforms

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Existing theory suggests that, in an unregulated market for corporate control, the level of takeovers is suboptimal because shareholders do not receive the full benefit from them.However, existing theory neglects that the threat of takeover may divert managerial effort from productive to defensive activities.This paper shows that, when this is considered, takeovers may, in fact, be excessive.I.

Abon Mozumdar, Corporate Hedging and Speculative Incentives: Implications for Swap Market Default Risk, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue on International Corporate Governance (Jun., 2001), pp. 221-250

This paper shows how to decompose the dollar profit earned from an option into two basic components: i) mispricing of the option relative to the asset at the time of purchase; and ii) profit from subsequent fortuitous changes or mispricing of the underlying asset. This separation hinges on measuring the true relative of the option from its realized payoff. The payoff from any one option has a huge standard error about this value that can be reduced by averaging the payoff from several independent option positions. Simulations indicate that 95% reductions in standard errors can be further achieved by using the payoff of a dynamic replicating portfolio as a Monte Carlo control variate. In addition, the paper shows that these low standard errors are robust to discrete rather than continuous dynamic replication and to the likely degree of misspecification of the benchmark formula used to implement the replication. Option mispricing profit can be further decomposed into profit due to superior esti? mation of the volatility (volatility profit) and profit from using a superior option valuation formula (formula profit). To make this decomposition reliably, the benchmark formula used for the attribution needs to be similar to the formula implicitly used by the market to price options. If so, then simulation indicates that this further decomposition can be achieved with low standard errors. Basic component ii) can be further decomposed into profit from a forward contract on the underlying asset (asset profit) and what I term pure option profit. The asset profit indicates whether the investor was skillful by buying or selling options on mispriced underlying assets. However, asset profit could also simply be just compensation for bearing risk?a distinction beyond the scope of this paper. Al? though simulation indicates that the attribution procedure gives an unbiased allocation of the option profit to this source, its standard error is large?a feature common with others' attempts to measure performance of assets.

William N. Goetzmann, , K. Geert Rouwenhorst, Day Trading International Mutual Funds: Evidence and Policy Solutions, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 287-309

Negative abnormal stock returns of about 1% occur near record dates of stock splits. Further, the lower the returns, the more positive are ex-date returns and when-issued premiums. A possible explanation of these related phenomena is that trading hindrances associated with record dates create trading inconvenience that is reflected in lower prices near record dates. In turn, anomalous positive ex-date returns arise in part from the abnormally low prices of unsplit shares caused by the negative record date returns.

The leading explanation for the post-issue long-run stock return underperformace of seasoned equity offering firms is that investors have optimistic expectations regarding future earnings and the underperformance occures as these expectations are corrected over time. To directly test this hypothessis, we examine investors' reaction to quarterly earnings announcements over a five-year period following the offering for a large sample of seasoned equity issuing firms. In general, our evidence suggests that investorsare not disappointed by earnings announcements that follow seasoned equity offerings. This result is not sensitive to widening the windown over which earnings announcement returns are computed. This result also holds true for subsets of equity issuing firms. The choice fo these three subsets is predicated by extant evidence that these firms are likely to convey relatively more unfavorable information throung their earnings announcements. Overall, our findings are inconsistent with the optimistic expectations hypotgesis.

In this paper, we determine whether each bid (ask) quote reflects the trading interest of the specialist, limit order traders, or both for a sample of NYSE stocks in 1991. We then compare Nasdaq spreads with NYSE spreads that reflect the trading interest of the specialist. Our empirical results show that the average Nasdaq spread is significantly larger than the average NYSE specialist spread. We find that, on average, 49% of the difference between Nasdaq and specialist spreads is due to the differential use of even-eighth quotes between Nasdaq dealers and NYSE specialists. We also find that the NYSE specialist spread is significantly larger than the limit order spread, although NYSE specialists and limit order traders are similiar in their use of even-eighth quotes.

Srinivas Nippani, Pu Liu, Craig T. Schulman, Are Treasury Securities Free of Default?, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue on International Corporate Governance (Jun., 2001), pp. 251-265

We examine whether the market demand curve for equities is dawnward sloping. Unlike previous studies that examine individual stocks' demand curves, we look at the aggregate demand curve. As a proxy for aggregate demand, we employ equity mutual fund flows. Unlike previous studies that focus on events that are unlikely to convey new information to the market, we devise an empirical framework that disentangles the price-pressure effect and the information effect. We do not find evidence for the price-pressure effect that equity fund flows directly affect stock market prices in the presence of fundamentals of firms. Instead, we find that equity fund flows seem to be influenced by the performance of the stock market and that investors try to forecast fundamentals of firms and change their demand for stocks accordingly. Overall, these findings are with a horizontal market demand curve for equities.