Knowledge that Transforms

We study earnings management (EM) efforts surrounding seasoned bond offerings using discretionary current accruals. We find that issuers tend to inflate earnings performance prior to an offering. In order for EM efforts to effectively mislead ratings agencies and the bond market, they must lead to inflated bond ratings and decreased offering yields. Regression results indicate the opposite; aggressive EM efforts are associated with lower initial ratings and higher offering yields. We also find a statistically lower proportion of subsequent downgrades for firms with the most aggressive EM efforts, which is inconsistent with these firms’ inflated initial ratings. While some firms may attempt to mislead ratings agencies and market participants by window-dressing earnings, these efforts appear to be counterproductive.

Congress and activists recently proposed giving shareholders a say (vote) on executive pay. We find that when the House passed the Say-on-Pay Bill, the market reaction was significantly positive for firms with high abnormal chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, with low pay-for-performance sensitivity, and responsive to shareholder pressure. However, activist-sponsored say-on-pay proposals target large firms, not those with excessive CEO pay, poor governance, or poor performance. The market reacts negatively to labor-sponsored proposal announcements and positively when these proposals are defeated. Our findings suggest that say-on-pay creates value for companies with inefficient compensation but can destroy value for others.

Using stock returns around recommendation changes to measure the information produced by analysts, I find that analysts produce more firm-specific than industry-level information. Analysts produce more firm-specific information on stocks with higher idiosyncratic return volatilities. The amount of industry information produced by analysts increases with the absolute value of the stock’s industry beta and decreases with the stock’s idiosyncratic volatility. Other stocks in the industry also respond to the recommendation change, and the magnitude of the response increases with the absolute value of the industry beta of the recommended stock and that of other stocks in the industry. I also offer results on how investors may use analyst research more effectively and potentially improve their investment performance.

We study earnings management (EM) efforts surrounding seasoned bond offerings using discretionary current accruals. We find that issuers tend to inflate earnings performance prior to an offering. In order for EM efforts to effectively mislead ratings agencies and the bond market, they must lead to inflated bond ratings and decreased offering yields. Regression results indicate the opposite; aggressive EM efforts are associated with lower initial ratings and higher offering yields. We also find a statistically lower proportion of subsequent downgrades for firms with the most aggressive EM efforts, which is inconsistent with these firms’ inflated initial ratings. While some firms may attempt to mislead ratings agencies and market participants by window-dressing earnings, these efforts appear to be counterproductive.

We study the conflict of interests between the limited partners (LPs) and the general partner (GP) in a venture capital (VC) fund with a limited life span. LPs commit money, while the GP selects and monitors projects. Midway into the project, the GP privately observes the project’s quality and the estimated time to exit. The fund’s limited time horizon and the GP’s informational advantage lead to inefficient decisions at this stage. First, the GP continues bad projects. Second, he may stop monitoring good, but delay-prone projects. We provide empirical predictions and illustrative evidence that the magnitude of the effect is significant.

Recent papers have debated whether the negative correlation between measures of firm asset growth and subsequent returns is of little importance since it applies only to small firms, is justified as compensation for risk, or is evidence of mispricing. We show that the asset growth effect is pervasive, and evidence to the contrary arises due to specification choices; that one measure of asset growth, the change in total assets, largely subsumes the explanatory power of other measures; that the ability of asset growth to explain either the cross section of returns or the time series of factor loadings is linked to firm idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL); that the return effect is concentrated around earnings announcements; and that analyst forecasts are systematically higher than realized earnings for faster growing firms. In general, there appears to be no asset growth effect in firms with low IVOL. Our findings are consistent with a mispricing-based explanation for the asset growth effect in which arbitrage costs allow the effect to persist.

The recent credit crisis has highlighted the importance of market liquidity and its interaction with the price of credit risk. We investigate this interaction by relating the liquidity of corporate bonds to the basis between the credit default swap (CDS) spread of the issuer and the par-equivalent bond yield spread. The liquidity of a bond is measured using a recently developed measure called latent liquidity , which is defined as the weighted average turnover of funds holding the bond, where the weights are their fractional holdings of the bond. We find that bonds with higher latent liquidity are more expensive relative to their CDS contracts after controlling for other realized measures of liquidity. Analysis of interaction effects shows that highly illiquid bonds of firms with a greater degree of uncertainty are also expensive, consistent with limits to arbitrage between CDS and bond markets, due to the higher costs of “shorting” illiquid bonds. Additionally, we document the positive effects of liquidity in the CDS market on the CDS-bond basis. We also find that several firm- and bond-level variables related to credit risk affect the basis, indicating that the CDS spread does not fully capture the credit risk of the bond.

We consider a Lucas-type exchange economy with two heterogeneous stocks (trees) and a representative investor with constant relative risk aversion. The dividend process for one stock follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant and known parameters. The expected dividend growth rate for the other tree is stochastic and in general unobservable, although there may be a signal from which the investor can learn about its current value. We find that the equilibrium quantities in our model significantly depend on the information structure and on the level of risk aversion. While an observable stochastic drift mainly makes the economy more risky, a latent expected growth rate process with learning significantly changes the equilibrium price-dividend ratios, price reactions to dividend and drift innovations, expected returns, volatilities, correlations, and differences between the stocks. These effects are the more pronounced the more risk averse the representative investor.

We study the role played by the informal links, or “connections,” between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the divisional managers of conglomerate organizations. Using data on a large sample of multisegment U.S. corporations from 1996 to 2004, we show that segments run by connected managers receive more investment and exhibit lower sensitivity to cash flow shortfalls (and exhibit higher sensitivity to other segments’ cash flow). At the firm level, having more connected managers presiding over segments with high Tobin’s Q improves resource allocation and increases firm value. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the mutual trust associated with connections reduces the need for wasteful reallocation of resources across divisions of conglomerate firms.

This paper documents the short- and long-term balance sheet effect of cash flows. We show that cash savings in the short run and debt reduction in both the short and the long run account for a substantial fraction of cash flow use. Although, in the long run, investment exhibits substantial sensitivity to cash flows, investment does not absorb the entire cash flow shock. In fact, the tighter the financial constraints, the smaller the fraction of cash flow absorbed by investment and the more by leverage reduction. Firms stage their response to increases in cash flow, delaying investment while building up cash stocks and reducing leverage. These results suggest that much of the short-run economic effect of cash flow shocks to the corporate sector may be channeled into the corporate debt market rather than the capital goods market, especially when financing constraints tighten.