Knowledge that Transforms

We show that the decision to go public is influenced by spatial variation in the supply of equity financing. We measure the amount of capital of equity investors in each U.S. region and document that the incidence of initial public offerings (IPOs) by intangible-intensive resident firms increases significantly when regional equity capital is abundant. Using a novel empirical strategy and hand-collected data on out-of-state pension flows, we confirm that our findings are not due to underlying regional factors.

We exploit U.S. states’ staggered adoption of Universal Demand (UD) laws to study how the risk of shareholder lawsuits affects insider trading. UD laws, which make it harder for shareholders to bring derivative lawsuits against directors and officers, lead to more profitable insider trades, especially sales. This effect is stronger among smaller firms and firms with lower institutional monitoring. After UD laws, the timing of insiders’ trades also appears more opportunistic and riskier, for example, sales increase before negative earnings surprises. Overall, our study offers clean evidence that the threat of shareholder litigation deters opportunistic insider trading.

We report evidence consistent with institutional investors using industry-level information that they obtain from their investments in venture capital (VC) funds to earn excess returns in publicly traded stocks. We use court rulings regarding the Freedom of Information Act as an exogenous shock affecting the information flow between VC funds and institutional investors to show that the excess returns are explained by information received via this channel. Thus, institutional investors serve as conduits of information from private to public markets. In the process, institutional investors earn higher returns from their VC investments than implied by the cash flows received therefrom.

We characterize optimal mutual fund risk-taking strategies in competitive multi-period tournaments among multiple players. With multiple competitors, every player begins by taking maximum risk. In the final period, all players continue to take maximum risk except the leading player, who employs a “lock-in” strategy that depends on the magnitude of the lead. Our theory predicts the leader should strategically lock in advantage by reducing risk-taking if and only if the lead is great enough, rather than an increase in risk-taking by the trailers to try to catch up. Empirical evidence from style-adjusted mutual fund tournaments provides strong and robust support.

A well-documented pattern of bank lending during crises is allocating credit to insolvent firms at the expense of productive firms, leading to inefficient resource allocation at the macro level. I investigate the role of bank CEOs in influencing such distortions during crises, using the strictly enforced age-based retirement policy of Indian government-controlled banks. I find that banks experiencing a CEO turnover in a crisis are less likely to bail out insolvent borrowers, as the new CEO has a lower incentive to do so. Consequently, the efficiency of credit allocation improves, and the zombification of the economy decreases.

We document firms often determine CEO equity grants based on a predetermined dollar value (value-based equity grant) instead of on the number of shares (share-based grant). Value-based equity grants weaken the relationship between stock performance and CEO equity pay, lower CEO portfolio delta, and slow firms’ investment in R&D. We find that retention pressure is a key reason for the use of value-based equity pay, while governance could also matter. Overall, this paper alerts boards to the unintended consequences of pursuing a target pay level or pay structure because such practices can lead to value-based equity grants in CEO compensation.

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This article offers two novel backtests to evaluate the adequacy of well-known systemic risk measures such as CoVaR, MES, SES, and SRISK. Both the new backtests are robust to estimation risk (i.e., their null distributions remain invariant in the presence of estimation risk). While existing backtest is consistent against divergence from the null hypothesis up to a finite order, the article shows that the new backtests are fully consistent. The real-world implications brought by the new backtests are economically significant as they reveal significantly more cases of inadequate systemic risk modeling among the major financial institutions.

We show theoretically and empirically that the cross-section of stock return idiosyncratic volatilities contains useful information about the ICAPM. We construct a proxy cross-sectional bivariate idiosyncratic volatility (CBIV) for the covariance risk between the market and the unobserved hedge portfolio under the ICAPM. Consistent with the ICAPM pricing relation, CBIV is a robust and significant predictor of the equity risk premium. We further show that the return predictability of the tail index in Kelly and Jiang (2014) can be explained by the ICAPM covariance risk.

We examine whether intellectual property protection facilitates the greater incorporation of firm-specific information into the stock price. Employing the staggered, country-level adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), we find that after adoption, stock prices become less synchronous, consistent with more firm-specific information being impounded into the stock price. We further show that this effect is more pronounced for more innovative firms, firms in countries with stronger law enforcement, and firms with more financial analyst coverage. Finally, we document that TRIPS induces a richer information environment characterized by more management forecasts and media coverage.