An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

TIONS." Although any papers which fit into the general topic area will be considered, highest priority will be given to papers dealing with the management of financial institutions. We would like to see papers which apply developed theory to the problems facing the managers of financial institutions. Papers developing new theory with potential application or those which present actual applications are included in this priority. The intent is to develop the link between theory and practice as much as possible within the general confines of the topic area.

How does the market value “toxic” structured-credit securities? We study the valuation of what is possibly the most toxic of all toxic assets: the equity tranche of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO). In theory, CDO equity should be similar in nature to bank stock since both represent residual claims on a portfolio of loans. We find CDO equity returns are much more related to stock returns than to fixed-income returns. CDO equity returns track the returns of financial stocks much more closely than any other industry. Nearly two-thirds of the variation in CDO returns can be explained by fundamentals.

It appears to a widely held view that corporations with similar operational characteristics ought to have similar financial characteristics. For example, one might expect that the financial characteristics of two drug companies would be similar. This seems entirely reasonable. Unfortunately however, there does not appear to be any quantitative analysis of this point in the literature. Furthermore, discussions with our financial colleagues lead to the conclusion that, if such financial differentiation of corporations were possible, it is by no means obvious what the variables of differentiation would be. Consequently, such an analysis was undertaken and is described in this paper. The basic question asked is whether the statistical grouping of corporations by their financial characteristics is similar to their predetermined, external, industrial classification.

Scott W. Barnhart, Robert McNown, Myles S. Wallace, Non-Informative Tests of the Unbiased Forward Exchange Rate, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 265-291

We analyze the effects of venture capital (VC) backing on profitability of private firm acquisitions. We find that VC backing leads to significantly higher acquirer announcement returns, averaging 3%, even after controlling for deal characteristics and endogeneity of venture funding. This leads us to investigate whether some VCs have interests that conflict with those of other investors. We show that such conflicts arise from VCs having financial relationships with both acquirers and targets, corporate VCs having a dominant strategic focus, and VC funds nearing maturity experiencing pressure to liquidate. Our conclusions follow from examinations of target takeover premia and acquirer announcement returns.

We investigate the effects of target initiation in M&As. We find target-initiated deals are common and that important motives for these deals are target economic weakness, financial constraints, and negative economy-wide shocks. We determine that average takeover premia, target abnormal returns around merger announcements, and deal value to EBITDA multiples are significantly lower in target-initiated deals. This gap is not explained by weak target financial conditions. Adjusting for self-selection, we conclude that target managers’ private information is a major driver of lower premia in target-initiated deals. This gap widens as information asymmetry between merger partners rises.

Scott W. Barnhart, Andrew C. Szakmary, Testing the Unbiased Forward Rate Hypothesis: Evidence on Unit Roots, Co- Integration, and Stochastic Coefficients, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 245-267

To protect inframarginal rents, rivals react to competition shocks by increasing product differentiation or lowering costs by standardizing products and production processes. We test these two mutually exclusive reactions by exploiting changes in rivals’ idiosyncratic stock return comovement following significant tariff cuts. While increased product differentiation implies a reduction in return comovement, greater standardization implies the opposite (a comovement increase). Difference-in-differences (DID) tests indicate that tariff cuts cause a significant increase in return comovement—in particular among within-industry “followers.” Treatment effects on cash flows, product counts, similarity scores, and business segment counts further support cost-cutting strategies.

We find that the Campbell–Cochrane external-habit model can generate a value premium if the persistence of the consumption surplus is sufficiently low. Such low persistence is supported by micro evidence on consumption. If the mean and conditional volatility of consumption growth are highly persistent, as in the Bansal–Yaron long-run risk model, then fast-moving habit can also generate, without eroding the value premium: i) empirically sensible long horizon return predictability; and ii) a price–dividend ratio for market equity that exhibits the high autocorrelation found in the data. Fast-moving habit also delivers several empirical properties of market-dividend strips.