Knowledge that Transforms

Recent models of herding suggest that speculators may rationally trade on information unrelated to fundamentals when their trading horizons are short. This study provides an empirical example where this appears to be the case. Johnson Redbook's weekly retail sales figures predicted bond returns for a short time after a significant number of bond traders began purchasing and trading on the data. The significant relationship between the data and bond returns disappeared just after the Wall Street Journal started to report it. Mean while, there was little or no change in the relationship between the data and retailers' stock returns, perhaps because the data have long been followed by retail stock analysts, Johnson Redbook's original investor clientele.

Lawrence Kryzanowski, Simon Lalancette, Minh Chau To, Performance Attribution using an APT with Prespecified Macrofactors and Time-Varying Risk Premia and Betas, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 205-224

Raymond M. Brooks, Tie Su, A Simple Cost Reduction Strategy for Small Liquidity Traders: Trade at the Opening, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 525-540

We examine market efficiency before and after the 1987 Market Crash using the box spread strategy implemented with European-style S&P 500 Index (SPX) options. Before the Crash, apparent arbitrage opportunities were rare and simulated trades were unprofitable assuming a one-minute execution delay. After the Crash, apparent arbitrage opportunities were frequent and simulated trades were profitable even assuming a five-minute execution delay. Our analysis makes the routine assumption that quotes are good until updated to construct a time series of prevailing quotes sampled at 30-second intervals. If this assumption is valid, then arbitrage profits were actually available. If this assumption is invalid, then such profits could have been illusory. Either scenario, however, implies that SPX market efficiency decreased following the Crash—prevailing price quotes repeatedly failed to satisfy the fundamental parity relation underlying the box spread.

Pierluigi Balduzzi, Silverio Foresi, David J. Hait, Price Barriers and the Dynamics of Asset Prices in Equilibrium, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 137-159

We analyze myopic trader models of noisy prices in financial markets. Unlike extant analysis, such as De Long et al. (1990a), a classical equilibrium exists in our analysis, e.g., a riskless perpetuity is priced by arbitrage and its price does not vary with noise. A unique noisy equilibrium exists only when i) noise traders' beliefs are rational regarding volatility and irrational regarding expected returns, and ii) noise traders can hold infinite positions. In the absence of these strong assumptions, multiple noisy equilibria can coexist with the classical equilibrium, but these equilibria exhibit conflicting comparative statics. Furthermore, the price of a long-lived asset with risky cash flows can vary with noise even when investors are not myopic. One conclusion is that myopia is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for noisy prices. A second is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to use myopic trader models to derive implications for investment or regulatory policy.

FINANCIAL MARKET;ENTREPRISES;RISK;ECONOMIC MODELS

Jeff Hubbard, Roni Michaely, Do Investors Ignore Dividend Taxation? A Reexamination of the Citizens Utilities Case, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 117-135

The National Association of Security Dealers alleges that professional-trader use of the Small Order Execution System (SOES) causes greater security price volatility. We docu? ment bidirectional Granger causality between a proxy for professional SOES trading (the frequency of maximum-sized SOES trades) and a measure of stock price volatility. We find that high levels of volatility precede high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades, suggesting that volatility causes more frequent large SOES trades. Likewise, over a one-minute time interval, high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades cause high volatility. Over longer periods, however, intense maximum-sized SOES trading causes lower volatility. Inter? preted in conjunction with Harris and Schultz (1997), these results suggest that high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades lead to more efficient price discovery. In light of these results, we believe that efforts to eliminate SOES based on volatility considerations are unwarranted.

The properties of variance ratio tests across trading and non-trading periods are examined using the generalized method of moments. For the case of opening and closing return variances, the joint tests indicate that the null hypothesis that the variance of opening returns equals the variance of closing returns cannot be rejected for a sample of New York Stock Exchange stocks. This example demonstrates the importance of accounting for overlapping observations and cross correlation in such frameworks. The conventional average (across assets) variance ratio test is shown to be biased against the null in small samples. Specifically, when non-zero correlations are ignored, previous tests have the wrong asymptotic size. This bias persists in other frameworks as well: although this study confirms earlier findings that the return variance during non-trading periods is significantly lower than during trading periods, test statistics that ignore correlations are shown to be inflated.