Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the relation between changes in firm value associated with public equityissue announcements and management ownership, nonmanagement large block ownership, institutional ownership, information variables, and leverage. A significant negative relationis found between the ratio of announcement period abnormal returns to changes in management ownership and the level of management ownership. This result is consistent with Stulz (1988) who predicts that firm value increases at a decreasing rate as management control of voting rights increases. This finding is also consistent with improvements in alignment of interests, where such improvements diminish as management becomes entrenched. The announcement period abnormal returns appear to be unrelated to outside blockholdings (large block ownership or institutional holdings), information variables, or leverage.

Myung-Jig Kim, Young-Ho Oh, Robert Brooks, Are Jumps in Stock Returns Diversifiable? Evidence and Implications for Option Pricing, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 609-631

Harry Turtle, Adolf Buse, Bob Korkie, Tests of Conditional Asset Pricing with Time-Varying Moments and Risk Prices, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 15-29

This study considers a model in which a corporate manager has private information and engages in i) anonymous trading on personal account in the secondary market, and ii) the corporate issuance of new shares in the primary market. The paper examines the equilibrium tradeoff of insider trading profits against the manager's share of the corporate consequences of the primary issue. In the resulting equilibrium, managers, acting in their own best interests, seem to behave according to differing objective functions. In some cases, they seem to maximize intrinsic value, in others, insider trading profits seem to dominate, and still others seem to be concerned with both. Hence, the presence of anonymous trading around corporate financings brings into question the use of corporate objective functions with exogenously fixed weights.

Michael S. Long, Illeen B. Malitz, Stephan E. Sefcik, An Empirical Examination of Dividend Policy Following Debt Issues, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 131-144

This paper considers the problem of a financial institution that needs to hedge a stream of state-contingent cash flows while facing borrowing and short-sales restrictions. The study determines analytically the strategy that minimizes the initial cost of hedging the desired cash flow, which is also the upper bound on its market price, and shows that the impact of leverage constraints on the cost of hedging call and put options is significant and, therefore, the biases detected by tests of option pricing models may not represent arbitrage opportunities. The paper also shows that with credit limits, it is optimal to reduce the rate of trading; thus, these constraints need to be recognized when estimating the trading volume generated in replicating contingent payoffs such as portfolio insurance.

This paper addresses the problem of testing financial models in the presence of market microstructure effects. The moment restrictions implied by the financial and market microstructure models are jointly tested using Hansen’s (1982) GMM approach. To illustrate the methodology, I consider the random walk model in combination with the bid-ask price effect model of Blume and Stambaugh (1983). Within this sufficiently simple framework, I obtain closed-form expressions for the estimators, standard errors of the estimators, and the test statistic, which affords an opportunity to examine the precision of the estimators and the power of the test as the return interval increases. I show that apparent rejections of the random walk model cannot be sustained when tests of the model are adjusted for market microstructure effects, and I discuss other applications of the methodology.

This paper provides an explanation for why firms may choose to simultaneously issue multiple debt claims with varying maturities. The optimal mix of short- and long-term debt allows the firm to precommit to a more efficient liquidation policy. Even in risk-neutral settings, the optimal mix hinges critically on the mean and the variability of the firm's liquidation value. Determining the optimal mix of debt is more complex than just weighing the costs of issuing short- or long-term debt exclusively. The implications of alternate priority structures, informational settings, interest rate uncertainty, and maturity matching strategies are also considered.

The adoption of liability limitation provisions (LLPs) is associated with insignificant stock price reactions for all firms, but with positive stock price reactions for poorly performing firms. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the net benefit of LLPs is larger for financially troubled firms than for other firms because outside directors are valuable to the distressed firm and LLPs substantially affect experts' expected costs of serving as directors of troubled firms.

Imre Karafiath, On the Efficiency of Least Squares Regression with Security Abnormal Returns as the Dependent Variable, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 279-300