Knowledge that Transforms

We propose a multifactor model in which the spot rate, LIBOR, follows a lognormal process, with a stochastic conditional mean, under the risk-neutral measure. In addition to the spot rate factor, the second factor is related to the premium of the first futures rate over the spot LIBOR. Similarly, the third factor is related to the premium of the second futures rate over the first futures rate. We calibrate the model to the initial term structure of futures rates and to the implied volatilities of interest rate caplets. We then apply the model to price interest rate derivatives such as European- and Bermudan-style swaptions, and yieldspread options. The model can be employed to price more complex interest rate derivatives such as path-dependent derivatives or multi-currency-dependent derivatives because of its Markovian property.

This paper aims to develop and compare bounds on the pricing formulas for European type discrete Asian options. The lower bound is found by conditioning the maturity payment of the Asian option by the geometric average and the bound derived can be expressed as a portfolio of delayed payment European call options. Several exercise price-dependent upper bounds are derived. Like the lower bound, one of the upper bounds is expressed as a portfolio of delayed payment European call options. Through a numerical analysis, we conclude that more information is gained from the readily calculated bounds than from the usually applied pricing approximations. From the closed-form solutions of the bounds, hedging positions are finally derived.

Our analysis explains how vulture investors (vultures) can maintain and exploit their rep- utations for toughness. Vultures leverage their reputations to extract concessions from stockholders in debt restructurings. To profit from these concessions, vultures must first acquire debt from incumbent bondholders. Buying only the tranches most likely to render them marginal creditors maximizes vulture leverage in debt-purchase negotiations. Vulture profits are proportional to the degree of uncertainty regarding the identity of the marginal debt class

Chen, Sean Chen, and Harry Sharma. We also benefited from discussions with our colleagues Ivan Brick, Oded Palmon, Emilio Venezian, and John Wald. We are particularly indebted to the anonymous referee and the editor, Paul Malatesta, for their valuable suggestions that greatly improve the paper. All errors are our own.

Recent theoretical models show that irrational expectations can generate return predictability consistent with apparent violations of weak-form market efficiency documented in the empirical literature. These behavioral models constrain rational investors' ability toexploit inter-temporal predictability by assuming that rational agents face high transactions costs, are myopic, or are non-existent. This paper presents a model in which there are two types of irrational expectations, one that causes momentum and another that creates reversals. I investigate whether these types of predictability will persist in the presence of fully rational agents who face no transactions costs, are long lived, and trade dynamically to optimally exploit any predictability due to irrational mispricings. I show that weak-form market efficiency will be violated under two very weak conditions: rational investors are risk averse and the fundamental value of the asset is risky. The paper also investigates the accumulation of wealth by trader type and shows that irrational agents will survive under a large set of parameters.

We study how minimum trading unit changes on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange impact a stock's trading activity, price volatility, and value. The value effects are consistent with Merton's (1987) model, i.e., an increase in the investor base (trading volume) and a decrease in price noisiness affect stock value positively. Our results extend Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno's (1999) tests of Merton by demonstrating a clear relation between price noisiness changes and stock value changes, and by showing that the response to a minimum trading unit decrease becomes less favorable (and arguably even negative) in the thinnest trading stocks.

This paper examines the degree of anonymity—the extent to which a trader is recognized as informed—on alternative market structures. We find evidence that is consistent with less anonymity on the NYSE specialist system compared to the NASDAQ dealer system. Specifically, when corporate insiders trade medium-sized quantities (500–9, 999 shares inclusive), NYSE listed stocks exhibit larger changes in proportional effective spreads than NASDAQ stocks. Taken together, these findings are consistent with Barclay and Warners (1993) contention that stealth (medium-sized) trades are more likely based on private information and insider trades are more transparent on the NYSE specialist system relative to the NASDAQ dealer system. The results support the hypothesis by Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) that the unique relationship between specialists and floor brokers on the NYSE leads to less anonymity.

To sign option trades as buys and sells, researchers often employ stock trade classification rules including the quote, the Lee and Ready (1991), the Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000), and the tick methods. Using a proprietary CBOE dataset that reports trade direction, we find that these four rules sign correctly 83%, 80%, 77%, and 59% of all classifiable trades, respectively. These rates are based on separate classifiable samples because each of the four rules fails to classify some trades (e.g., the quote rulecannot classify midspread trades). Outside-quote and reversed-quote trades are highly misclassified by all four rules. The probability of such trades is related to trading frequency, trade size, moneyness, and maturity. Underlying asset price changes around the time of the trade improve classification precision. We find that the components of index option complex trades not executed on the Retail Automated Execution System are misclassified almost 50% of the time by any method. The elimination of these trades (15% of the sample) results in a success rate of over 87% for the quote rule.

To explain post-earnings announcement drift, we construct a risk factor related to unexpected earnings surprise, and propose a four-factor model by adding this risk factor to Fama and French's (1993), (1995) three-factor model. This earnings surprise risk factor provides a remarkable improvement in explaining post-earnings announcement drift when included in addition to the three factors of Fama and French. After adjusting raw returns for the four risk factors, the cumulative abnormal returns over the 60 trading days subsequent to quarterly earnings announcements are economically and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, except for the first two days after the earnings announcement, the cumulative abnormal returns and the arbitrage returns from our four-factor model are relatively stable over the testing period and never significant on any day of the testing period. On the other hand, the arbitrage returns from the other models increase over the 60-day testing period. We argue that most of the post-earnings announcement drift observed in prior studies may be a result of using misspecified models and failing to appropriately adjust raw returns for risk.

J. Michael Pinegar, R. Ravichandran, U.S. Investors' Perceptions of Corporate Control in Mexico: Evidence from Sibling ADRs, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 213-230