We construct a measure ( fLMA ) of the extent to which neighboring firms hire similar types of workers, based on the similarity between the labor profile of a firm and that of its locality. We show that a firm’s innovation is positively related to fLMA. The enhanced labor mobility induced by higher fLMA is an important channel for this positive relation. This relation is stronger when firms have increased outside job opportunities for employees, increased knowledge spillovers via coworkership, and more employee stock options. Innovation is higher when intellectual property ownership is with employers, not employees. This effect increases in fLMA

The word revolution is entirely appropriate for describing the changes in financial institutions and instruments that have occurred in the past twenty years. The major impulses to successful financial innovations have come from regulations and taxes. The outlook for the future is for a slowing down of the rate of financial innovation, but much growth and improvement are still in prospect

By integrating staggered interstate banking deregulation into a gravity model following Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013), (2016), we construct a time-varying, bank-specific instrument for geographic diversification and investigate its causal effect on corporate innovation via the lending channel. We find that bank geographic diversification spurs corporate innovation and enhances the economic value of innovation. We identify relaxing debt covenants and alleviating borrowers’ financial constraints as the two underlying mechanisms explaining the documented effects. Moreover, by offering lenient covenants, geographically diversified banks provide greater financial and operational flexibility to borrowing firms, enabling them to engage in future mergers and acquisitions

We examine the relevance of informal contracting mechanisms for corporate innovation. Using social capital to capture the social costs imposed on opportunistic behavior by management, we report evidence that firms headquartered in states with higher levels of social capital are associated with more innovation. This result is more pronounced when employees are more susceptible to holdup (e.g., firms with low labor union coverage, firms located in states with weak legal protections for employees, and firms surrounded by few external employment opportunities) and when employees face higher levels of information asymmetry. Our study highlights the importance of informal contracts for innovation

This article provides new evidence on how access to finance affects technological innovation and establishes the role of labor practices in shaping this relation. We exploit a unique setting, pre-Civil War America, where staggered adoption of free banking laws across states encouraged bank entry, and variation in the use of exploited workers in agriculture generated differences in producers’ demands for labor-saving technologies. Results show that access to finance spurred innovation; the positive effect on agricultural innovation diminished with labor exploitation. We establish the causal role of labor exploitation using the 1850s cholera pandemic and the influx of Irish immigrants

Keith C. Brown, W. V. Harlow, Seha M. Tinic, The Risk and Required Return of Common Stock following Major Price Innovations, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 101-116

This paper examines the impact of competition on the optimal organization and financing structures in innovation-intensive industries. We show that as an optimal response to competition, firms may choose external organization structures established in collaboration with specialized start-ups where they provide start-up financing from their own resources. As the intensity of the competition to innovate increases, firms move from internal to external organization of projects to increase the speed of product innovation and to obtain a competitive advantage with respect to rival firms in their industry. We also show that as the level of competition increases, firms provide a higher level of financing for externally organized projects in the form of corporate venture capital (CVC). Our results help explain the emergence of organization and financing arrangements such as CVC and strategic alliances, where large established firms organize their projects in collaboration with external specialized firms and provide financing for externally organized projects from their own internal resources

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If a firm is considering replacing part of its productive facility because of obsolescence rather than wear-and-tear (e.g., purchasing a new model machine), it weighs the expected gains against the expected costs. A problem may arise when the rate of technological innovation for the type of machinery is extremely rapid. Such replacement may yield a gain if made today, but because innovations are so rapid, a year's delay in replacement may yield a greater net gain, and it would seem wiser to wait the year. But each year the same reasoning seems to hold; the more rapidly innovations seem likely to occur, the more likely a firm is to delay. If technology is advancing quickly enough, a firm may never consider any time a good time for replacement

Credit default swaps (CDSs) are a major financial innovation related to debt contracting. Because CDS markets facilitate bad news being incorporated into equity prices via cross-market information spillover, CDS availability may curb firms’ information hoarding. We find that CDS trading on a firm’s debt reduces the future stock price crash risk. This effect is stronger in active CDS markets, when the main lenders are CDS market dealers with securities trading subsidiaries, or when managers have more motivation to hoard information. Our findings suggest that debt market financial innovations curtail the negative equity market effects of firms withholding bad news