Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate incentive effects of a typical hedge fund contract for a manager with power utility. With a one-year horizon, the manager displays risk taking that varies dramatically with fund value. We extend the model to multiple yearly evaluation periods and find that the manager's risk taking is rapidly moderated if the fund performs reasonably well. The most realistic approach to modeling fund closure uses an endogenous shutdown barrier where the manager optimally chooses to shut down. The manager increases risk taking as fund value approaches that barrier, and this boundary behavior persists strongly with multiyear horizons.

I investigate what leads controlling families of publicly traded firms to sell their remaining ownership stake. The sale of a controlling stake is best explained in the context of theories of the firm related to optimal risk bearing, the separation of ownership and management expertise, the CEO succession process, and the monitoring provided by outside blockholders. A timing explanation is only marginally supported. The sale of a controlling stake is not explained by insufficient financial resources to fully invest in growth opportunities. This study offers insights into the final stage of the process in which entrepreneurs sequentially sell their firm to outside parties and also identifies the nature of costs of concentrated ownership.

Analysts' earnings forecasts are influenced by their desire to win investment banking clients. We hypothesize that the equity bull market of the 1990s, along with the boom in investment banking business, exacerbated analysts' conflicts of interest and their incentives to strategically adjust forecasts to avoid earnings disappointments. We document shifts in the distribution of earnings surprises and related changes in the market's response to surprises and forecast revisions. The evidence for shifts is stronger for growth stocks, where conflicts of interest are more pronounced. However, shifts are less notable for analysts without ties to investment banking and in international markets.

This paper tests the expectations hypothesis (EH) using U.S. monthly data for bond yields spanning the 1952–2003 sample period and ranging in maturity from one month to 10 years. We apply the Lagrange multiplier test developed by Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) and extend it to increase the test power by introducing economic variables as conditioning information and by using more than two bond yields in the model and testing the EH jointly on more than one pair of yields. While the conventional bivariate procedure provides mixed results, the more powerful testing procedures suggest rejection of the EH throughout the maturity spectrum examined.

There is a large and growing literature on how to model the dynamics of the default-free term structure to fit the observed historical data. Much less is known about how best to model the dynamics of defaultable yield curves. This paper develops a class of defaultable term structure models that is tractable enough to be empirically implemented and flexible enough to capture some important behaviors of the credit spreads in the data. We compare two non-nested models within this class using a Bayesian estimation technique, which helps to solve the problem of latent state variables. The Bayesian approach also enables us to test the two non-nested models on the basis of the Bayes factor. The results strongly suggest that models with constant transition probabilities will not be able to fit the observed dynamics of inter-rating spreads.

This study investigates the role of corporate boards following large declines in share value surrounding acquisition announcements. The results indicate that firms with independent boards are less likely to complete these value-decreasing bids, suggesting that boards influence corporate responses to information in stock prices. Board independence is also associated with unusually high frequencies of asset restructuring for bids that are completed, suggesting that independent boards promote restructuring in mergers the market believes are difficult to integrate. These results complement existing evidence on the board's exante role in averting bad outcomes by showing that independent boards intervene following value-decreasing events.

abstract This study investigates whether the difference in individual shareholder tax rates between dividend income and capital gain (the dividend tax penalty) affects a firm's choice between distributing funds to shareholders through dividends or share repurchases. The results of this study suggest that, in periods in which the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to distribute funds to shareholders through share repurchases as opposed to dividends. The results also indicate that the relation between the dividend tax penalty and corporate payout choice is affected by the types of shareholders who own stock in the firm. As tax-disfavored institutional ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to repurchase shares as opposed to distributing dividends. In contrast, as tax-favored institutional ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are less likely to repurchase shares as opposed to distributing dividends. As senior managerial share ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to make distributions to shareholders in the form of share repurchases.

Prior research concludes that option introductions improve the average liquidity of the underlying stocks. We develop an improved, generalizable test to assess whether market quality changes occur on or near an event date. Applying this method to option listing events, we conclude that options do not systematically improve the market quality of the underlying security; rather, the market quality of the underlying security improves before the listing decision. Hazard model tests indicate that improving liquidity is a selection criterion in the option listing decision. Moreover, these tests suggest that the size of a stock's bid-ask spread is the single most important option listing determinant.

Given the growth in the importance and popularity of share repurchases, we use an alternative time-series approach to test two hypotheses on the motives for share repurchases and dividends: the flexibility hypothesis and the substitution hypothesis. By investigating both share repurchase and dividend payout policies in the context of a time-series vector autoregression, we account for the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of the two payout policies. We find that share repurchases are associated with temporary components of earnings, whereas dividends are not, and that share repurchases and dividends are imperfect substitutes.

We analyze how the availability of internal funds affects a firm's investment. We show that under fairly standard assumptions, the relation is U-shaped: investment increases monotonically with internal funds if they are large but decreases if they are very low. We discuss the tradeoff that generates the U-shape, and argue that models predicting an always increasing relation are based on restrictive assumptions. Using a large data set, we find strong empirical support for our predictions. Our results qualify conventional wisdom about the effects of financial constraints on investment behavior, and help to explain seemingly conflicting findings in the empirical literature.