Knowledge that Transforms

This paper develops a specialized principal-agent model of the investor-investment advisor relationship and embeds the standard advisory compensation schedule in the model. Advisors are endowed with information-gathering abilities and investors are endowed with funds. Information-gathering services are traded indirectly through the investor's receipt of portfolio returns net of advisory fees. Model results show that the parameters of the compensation schedule are both a function of the idiosyncracies of an advisor's information services and the degree of risk sharing between the advisor and investor. Several predictions of the model are supported using data on mutual fund advisors. Unsupported predictions may be due to self-selection of advisors by risk tolerance.

David Easley, Maureen O'Hara, Adverse Selection and Large Trade Volume: The Implications for Market Efficiency, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), pp. 185-208

David C. Mauer, Lemma W. Senbet, The Effect of the Secondary Market on the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: Theory and Evidence, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 55-79

Many empirical studies find that the distribution of stock returns departs from normality. In such cases, it is desirable to employ a statistical estimation procedure that may be more efficient than ordinary least squares. This paper describes various robust methods, which have attracted increasing attention in the statistical literature, in the context of estimating beta risk. The empirical analysis documents the potential efficiency gains from using robust methods as an alternative to ordinary least squares, based on both simulated and actual returns data.

The expectations theory of the term structure is well known to give wrong signals as to the future course of long-term interest rates. One explanation involves rational time-varying term premia. However, the “anomaly” may also be due to inflation forecast errors. We study survey forecasts of inflation. It seems that the respondents' forecasts are insufficiently adaptive. Interest rates reflect expectations similar to the inflation forecasts. As a result, past survey forecast errors reliably predict premia on U.S. Government Bonds.

This paper reexamines long-horizon stock returns and finds that previous work overstates the evidence of mean reversion. The overstatement is largely due to the implicit weighting of ordinary least-squares tests, which place more weight on the Depression and World War II observations, which have both large error variances and stronger mean-reverting tendencies. Additionally, the reliance on asymptotic statistics and the improper focus on only the most negative estimates of mean reversion contribute to the overstatement. Using generalized least-squares randomization tests on the 1926 to 1987 period, the random walk cannot be rejected for value- or equally-weighted real returns at any of 10 return horizons or by joint tests over all 10 horizons simultaneously. Additionally, the random walk cannot be rejected for the extended 1871 to 1987 period.

We solve for the optimal dynamic trading strategy of an investor who faces a leverage constraint, i.e., a limitation on his ability to borrow for the purpose of investing in a risky asset. We assume that the investor has constant relative risk aversion, and that the value of the risky asset follows a geometric Brownian motion. In the absence of the leverage constraint, the optimal strategy involves investing a fixed proportion of wealth in the risky asset. We prove that, in the presence of the leverage constraint, the optimal investment also involves investing a fixed proportion of wealth in the risky asset when the leverage constraint is not binding. However, the two proportions are different, reflecting the extent to which the investor alters his strategy even when the leverage constraint is not binding because of the possibility that the leverage constraint will become binding in the future.

Robert A. Korajczyk, Deborah J. Lucas, Robert L. McDonald, Equity Issues with Time-Varying Asymmetric Information, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 397-417

Even if true abnormal returns are uncorrelated, estimated abnormal returns are not. This paper presents a simple formula for the variance of estimated cumulative abnormal returns. Both returns and dummy variable procedures for estimating the standard error correctly, taking account of both intertemporal and contemporaneous correlation of estimated residuals, are discussed. They are then applied to an event study of post-merger performance. It is shown that ignoring either the intertemporal or contemporaneous correlation of residuals can result in significant underestimates of standard errors.

The paper analyzes lead-lag relationships for six major stock market indexes: New York S&P 500, Tokyo Nikkei, London FT–30, Hong Kong Hang Seng, Singapore Straits Times, and Australia All Ordinaries, for time periods before, during, and after the October 1987 market crash. Unidirectional and bidirectional causality tests are conducted by means of the Granger methodology. Practically no lead-lag relationships are found for the pre-crash and post-crash periods. However, important feedback relationships and unidirectional causality are detected for the month of the crash. There is also an increase in contemporaneous causality during and after the month of the crash. In general, our findings suggest that the October 1987 market crash probably was an international crisis of the equity markets and that it might have begun simultaneously in all the national stock markets.