Knowledge that Transforms

Using disaggregated panel data, we examine how firms change trade credit in response to a monetary tightening. We find that both accounts payable and accounts receivable increase with tighter monetary policy, implying that trade credit helps firms absorb the effect of a credit contraction. Further, both S&P 500 firms and a comparison group of smaller firms increase net trade credit (accounts receivable minus payable), making up for the reduced liquidity associated with tighter policy. However, we find no evidence that large firms play this role more actively than smaller firms.

We analyze the performance persistence in hedge funds taking into account look-ahead bias (multi-period sampling bias). We model liquidation of hedge funds by analyzing how it depends upon historical performance. Next, we use a weighting procedure that eliminates look-ahead bias in measures for performance persistence. In contrast to earlier results for mutual funds, the impact of look-ahead bias is exacerbated for hedge funds due to their greater level of total risk. At the four-quarter horizon, look-ahead bias can be as much as 3.8%, depending upon the decile of the distribution. We find positive persistence in hedge fund quarterly returns after correcting for investment style. The empirical pattern at the annual level is also consistent with positive persistence, but its statistical significance is weak.

This paper analyzes the relation between the capital structure of a firm and the tax benefits realized from the exercise of stock options. Theory suggests that firms with tax benefits from the exercise of stock options should carry less debt since tax benefits are a non-debt tax shield. We find that both long- and short-term debt ratios are negatively related to the size of tax benefits from option exercise. Moreover, one-year changes in long-term leverage are negatively related to changes in the number of options exercised. Such a relation does not exist for changes in short-term leverage. Finally, firms with option-related tax benefits tend to issue equity, with the net amount of equity issued an increasing function of these tax benefits.

This paper models the interaction of firm insiders and outsiders on a corporate board and addresses the question of the board's ideal size and composition. In the model, the board is responsible for monitoring projects and making CEO succession decisions. Inside directors are better informed regarding the quality of firm investment projects, but outsiders can use CEO succession to motivate insiders to reveal their superior information and help the board implement higher value projects. The optimal board structure is determined by the trade-off between maximizing the incentive for insiders to reveal their private information, minimizing coordination costs among outsiders and maximizing the ability of outsiders to reject inferior projects. I show that optimal board size and composition are functions of the directors' and the firm's characteristics. I also develop testable implications for crosssectional variations in the optimal board structure across firms.

This paper examines optimal capital structure choice using a dynamic capital structure model that is calibrated to reflect actual firm characteristics. The model uses contingent claim methods to value interest tax shields, allows for reorganization in bankruptcy, and maintains a long-run target debt to total capital ratio by refinancing maturing debt. Using this model, we calculate optimal capital structures in a realistic representation of the traditional trade-off model. In contrast to previous research, the calculated optimal capital structures do not imply that firms tend to use too little leverage in practice. We also estimate the costs borne by a firm whose capital structure deviates from its optimal target debt to total capital ratio. The costs of moderate deviations are relatively small, suggesting that a policy of adjusting leverage infrequently is likely to be reasonable for many firms.

The costs of implementing investment strategies represent a significant drag on the performance of mutual funds and other institutional investors. It is the responsibility of institutional investors, and in the interests of the individual investors they represent, to seek market mechanisms that mitigate trading costs. We investigate an example of one such liquidity provision mechanism whereby liquidity demanders auction a set of trades as a package directly to potential liquidity providers. A critical feature of the auction is that the identities of the securities in the package are not revealed to the bidder. We demonstrate that this mechanism provides a transactions cost savings relative to more traditional trading mechanisms for the liquidity demander as well as an efficient way for liquidity suppliers to obtain order flow. We argue that the cost savings afforded this new mechanism are due to the potential for low cost crosses with the bidder's existing inventory positions and through the longer trading horizon, and superior trading ability, of the bidders. This research suggests that the ability to innovate via new liquidity provision mechanisms can provide market participants with transaction cost savings that cannot be easily duplicated on more traditional exchanges.

Motivated by the fact that investors have limited time and attention to process information, this paper provides a continuous-time equilibrium model to analyze the effects of a capacity constraint in the learning process of a representative investor, who optimally allocates her information capacity across multiple sources of uncertainty. Consequently, the cross-sectional structure of information and the resulting asset price dynamics are determined endogenously. The model provides implications on both consumption behavior and the cross-sectional differences in price informativeness in terms of supply of information, speed of price adjustments to fundamental shocks, and price reactions to firm disclosures.

The retained earnings hypothesis predicts that stock distributions accounted for by reducing retained earnings are a more credible signal of managerial optimism than stock distributions that do not reduce retained earnings. This study examines the costs of false signaling that are a necessary pre-condition for the hypothesis and finds them to be generally very small, calling the validity of the hypothesis into question for most firms. However, prior studies report broad-based market evidence consistent with the hypothesis. To resolve this apparent inconsistency, the study replicates and extends tests of the retained earnings hypothesis contained in three prior studies, and shows that the findings in support of the retained earnings hypothesis can be attributed to specification and measurement choices that bias the results in favor of the hypothesis. The support for the retained earnings hypothesis is weaker when the sources of the bias are removed. However, some support for the hypothesis remains for a limited set of distributing firms.

I investigate whether changes in stock market participation costs can explain the long-term increase in the number of U.S. stockholders. I separate these costs into two components: an information cost (the cost of collecting market information), and an entry cost (all other costs, including commissions and fees), and disentangle their general equilibrium implications in a noisy rational expectations economy. While a falling information cost cannot explain the observed increase in stock market participation, a falling entry cost can account for this plus several other features of the U.S. economy, including the falling equity premium, rising return variances, and the boom in passive relative to active investing.

We construct a unique data set that includes all reported institutional block trades on the London Stock Exchange and analyze the market reaction to buy and sell trades. We find that the type of investors behind the trade and the combination of the trade's size and the trader's resulting level of ownership are the major determinants of the information effects and the asymmetry between price impacts of buy and sell trades. In particular, large trades undertaken by fund managers, the most active investors in our sample, have strong information content, while, for the remaining trades, we report limited support for the information and the price impact asymmetry hypotheses. These results hold even after accounting for trade complexity and volatility effects in the regressions.