Knowledge that Transforms

Many academic studies use fixed preannouncement event days (e.g., -20,-42, or -63) to measure takeover premiums. In this paper, we show that the use of traditional fixed windows generates premiums that are underestimated by as much as 8 percentage points. This downward bias is especially severe for transactions with long processes (e.g., target-initiated deals). We take account of this bias by hand collecting deal initiation dates and show that using these dates results in measured premiums that give contradictory conclusions to those found in existing literature. We also offer guidance for measuring premiums if hand collecting data is impractical.

In this article, we use volatility surface data from options contracts to document a strong, robust, and positive cross-sectional relation between risk-neutral skewness (RNS) and subsequent stock returns. The differential return between high- and low-RNS stocks amounts to 0.17% per week. Preannouncement RNS is positively related to earnings announcement returns, and the positive RNS–return relation is more pronounced for other nonscheduled news releases. This suggests that it is informed trading that drives the positive relation between RNS and subsequent stock returns. We also find that RNS contains incremental information beyond trading signals captured by option-implied volatility and volume.

We find that corporate innovation is positively related to board diversity as measured by a multidimensional index. The benefit of board diversity is more pronounced for firms with more complex operations, more experienced boards, and stronger external governance, suggesting that diverse boards have superior advising capacity. We find evidence to suggest that firms with diverse boards engage in more exploratory innovations and develop new technology in unfamiliar areas. As a result, they create a larger number of both most-cited and uncited patents. Finally, of the six different aspects of board diversity, professional diversity matters the most for corporate innovation.

We show that cross-border leveraged buyout investments involving U.S. rather than non-U.S. private equity (PE) investors are more likely to have a successful exit (initial public offering or acquisition). Exogenous increases in effective proximity following the signing of “open sky agreements” between the United States and target firms’ home countries increases both the propensity of U.S. PE firms to invest in these firms and the value addition by these investors. We show that such increases in value addition by U.S. PE investors following proximity increases are at least partially due to better monitoring, facilitated by the more efficient allocation of experienced U.S. PE managers to cross-border deals.

We study the quoting activity of market makers in relation to trading, liquidity, and expected returns. Empirically, we find larger quote-to-trade (QT) ratios in small, illiquid, or neglected firms, yet large QT ratios are associated with low expected returns. The last result is driven by quotes, not by trades. We propose a model of quoting activity consistent with these facts. In equilibrium, market makers monitor the market faster (and thus increase the QT ratio) in neglected, difficult-to-understand stocks. They also monitor faster when their clients are more precisely informed, which reduces mispricing and lowers expected returns.

I document wage convergence in conglomerates using detailed plant-level data: Workers in low-wage industries collect higher-than-industry wages when the diversified firm also operates in high-wage industries. I confirm this effect by exploiting the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and changes in minimum wages at the state level as sources of exogenous increases in wages in some plants. I then track the evolution of wages of the remaining workers of the firm, relative to workers of unaffiliated plants. Plants where workers collect higher-than-industry wages operate with higher capital intensity, suggesting that internal labor markets may affect investment decisions in internal capital markets.

We study the effect of algorithmic trading (AT) on market quality between 2001 and 2011 in 42 equity markets around the world. We use an exchange colocation service that increases AT as an exogenous instrument to draw causal inferences about AT on market quality. On average, AT improves liquidity and informational efficiency but increases short-term volatility. Importantly, AT also lowers execution shortfalls for buy-side institutional investors. Our results are surprisingly consistent across markets and thus across a wide range of AT environments. We further document that the beneficial effect of AT is stronger in large stocks than in small stocks.

We show that the prices of risk for factors that are nonlinear in the market return can be obtained using index option prices. The price of coskewness risk corresponds to the market variance risk premium, and the price of cokurtosis risk corresponds to the market skewness risk premium. Option-based estimates of the prices of risk lead to reasonable values of the associated risk premia. An analysis of factor models with coskewness risk indicates that the new estimates of the price of risk improve the models’ performance compared with regression-based estimates.

We survey over 1,000 venture capitalists (VCs) on how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected their decisions and investments. Despite the historical importance of in-person meetings, VCs do not report difficulty finding quality entrepreneurs or major changes in time allocation. They do report difficulty in evaluating deals, more investor-friendly terms, and a decreased investment rate, with about one-sixth of VCs reporting pressure from limited partners to conserve capital. Although aggregate returns are largely unchanged, there is high dispersion both within and across funds. A follow-up survey shows faster-than-expected recovery in deal volume, terms, and returns.

Excess control rights by inside shareholders have been documented to hurt minority shareholders. This paper shows that such governance feature may benefit creditors. Using a sample of U.S. dual-class firms, I show that these firms take less operational and financial risk than similar single-class firms, consistent with insiders’ emphasis on long-term survival to access ongoing private control benefits. Such risk avoidance translates into lower borrowing costs for dual-class firms. Further, lenders are able to use specific covenants to prevent potential expropriations by insiders. The overall relationship between excess control rights and firm value may be less negative than previously thought.