Knowledge that Transforms

Several studies indicate the presence of large abnormal returns accruing to shareholders of merged firms in the period immediately before the merger. For example, Mandelker [18] reports that stockholders of acquired firms earn abnormal returns of approximately 14 percent in the seven months preceding merger. Franks, Broyles, and Hecht [15] find abnormal returns of 26 percent for British firms during the four months prior to merger; Elgers and Clark [11] report 43 percent abnormal returns accruing over two years before merger to shareholders of acquired firms.

Based on Markowitz's pioneering study [40], Sharpe [56] and Lintner [38] advanced the first positivist formulations of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Their models were subsequently refined by Mossin [45], Fama [15], Black [1], and others. Even though the CAPM has been studied extensively, it has not been empirically validated. According to Roll [48], the CAPM cannot be tested in an unambiguous fashion because of a number of intractable measurement and computational difficulties, and the joint nature of the hypotheses to be tested.

Recently, the finance literature has included empirical analysis of consumption in asset pricing models based on the cross-equation restrictions implied by optimality of a representative agent's consumption and investment plan. These studies have required some specification of an aggregate utility function, and power (constant relative risk aversion) utility has been predominant. The present paper extends this body of research by including models with constant absolute, as well as constant relative, risk aversion.

The effect of dividends on the valuation of securities has been a controversial subject in financial research in recent years. Since Miller and Modigliani [8] demonstrated the irrelevance of dividend policy, researchers have tested and attempted to explain market price reaction to firms’ dividend decisions. Explanations of market reactions to dividend policyhave centered around information issues and tax effects. Information issues have been empirically investigated by examining market reactions to announcements of dividend changes. The effect of differential tax treatments of dividends and capital gains usually has been examined through cross-sectional regression testing the significance of dividend yield in explaining returns. Any market return study of dividends, however, should consider both the potential information effect and the tax effect.

Pamela P. Peterson, Gary A. Benesh, A Reexamination of the Empirical Relationship Between Investment and Financing Decisions, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec., 1983), pp. 439-453

Thomas S. Y. Ho, Anthony Saunders, Fixed Rate Loan Commitments, Take-Down Risk, and the Dynamics of Hedging with Futures, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec., 1983), pp. 499-516

Commercial banks have been the subjects of a large body of empirical research employing regression and econometric models and discriminant analysis. The purpose of this paper is to empirically identify and describe relationships, including hedging behavior, between the asset side and the liability/capital side of the balance sheets of a cross-section of large U.S. banks. Canonical correlation analysis is the statistical technique that is employed. Unlike regression analysis which explains the behavior of a single dependent variable as a function of a set of independent variables, canonical correlation analysis relates two sets of variables. In the present case, one set of variables is the composition of the lefthand side of the balance sheet and the other set is the right-hand side. The variables used in this study are asset and liability/capital categories expressed as a proportion of total bank assets (i.e., a percentage breakdown of the balance sheet or a common size statement). These proportions are used in lieu of the more usual financial ratios and no information exogenous to the bank is employed.

The standard models of consumer behavior under uncertainty are the expected utility model and the mean-variance model. As with any models involving unobservables one might well ask about the empirical content of these hypotheses: what restrictions on observed behavior do these models impose? How can one test observed behavior for consistency with these models? How can one recover the underlying utility function and forecast behavior in new situations?

The process of security price adjustment to the release of new information has long held the interest of the finance profession, both in academics and in practice. The efficiency of financial markets in reflecting new information significantly impacts the allocation of capital and income within the markets1 and, consequently, can affect social welfare. Thus, public, business, and investment policies are all related to an understanding of the functioning of security markets and their utilization of information. As a result, a significant body of economic research has considered the impact of information upon security markets under a number of alternative market structures. In this paper, we attempt to contribute to this literature by extending previous research in the two related areas of speculation and information dissemination.

In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller [11], [12] demonstrate that if capital markets are perfect and investment policy is held constant, the market value of the firm is independent of its financial decisions. Furthermore, if capital markets are perfect, stockholders have incentive to choose the investment policy which maximizes the market value of the firm (see [6]). Motivated by this assumption, the firm has been viewed as a “black box;” namely, as one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value. However, in a growing body of recent literature (see [1], [2], [7], [9], [13], and [14]), researchers recognize that the firm in an “imperfect” capital market is a collection of groups whose interests can, and do, conflict. Jensen and Meckling [9] study the roles of three important groups—the owner-manager, the stockholders, and the bondholders—focusing on the potential costs resulting from divergence of interests among them. They provide a theory of optimal capital structure in terms of reducing the costs of these conflicts.