Knowledge that Transforms

We use a database of recent high tech IPOs to estimate opportunity cost of capital for venture capital investors and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs face the risk-return tradeoff of the CAPM as the opportunity cost of holding a portfolio that necessarily is underdiversified. For early stage firms, we estimate the effects of underdiversification, industry, and financial maturity on opportunity cost. Assuming a one-year holding period, the entrepreneur's opportunity cost generally is two to four times as high as that of a well-diversified investor. With a 4.0% risk-free rate and 6.0% market risk premium, for the sample average, we estimate the cost of capital of a well-diversified investor to be 11.4%, which equates to 16.7% before the management fees and carried interest of a typical venture capital fund. For an entrepreneur with 25% of total wealth invested in the venture, our corresponding estimate of cost of capital is 40.0%.

Many financial institutions employ outside portfolio managers to manage part or all of their investable assets. It is well recognized that outside portfolio managers are unwilling to share security information with each other or with the centralized decision maker and this in general will lead to sub-optimal portfolios. In this paper, we derive an implementable set of rules under which a central decision maker can make optimal decisions without requiring decentralized decision makers to reveal estimates of security returns. Furthermore, we derive conditions under which these rules hold and when they do not hold.

I argue that overallocation is used as a marketing strategy to increase the offer price and aftermarket price of an initial public offering (IPO). I show that, when there is weak demand, it can be optimal for the underwriter to oversell an issue and take a naked short position. The issuing firm benefits from a higher expected offer price. This is in spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, allocating more shares when there is weak demand requires greater underpricing when there is strong demand.

This paper analyzes the optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with reputation effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), we empirically examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer strategy. In particular, we test whether the producers in our market invest in reputation building by initially selling high quality goods and then lowering quality. Using a variety of statistical tests, we find evidence consistent with reputation building, both in the aggregate and for individual developers.

This paper introduces a Monte Carlo simulation method for pricing multidimensional American options based on the computation of the optimal exercise frontier. We consider Bermudan options that can be exercised at a finite number of times and compute the optimal exercise frontier recursively. We show that for every date of possible exercise, any single point of the optimal exercise frontier is a fixed point of a simple algorithm. Once the frontier is computed, we use plain vanilla Monte Carlo simulation to price the option and obtain a low-biased estimator. We illustrate the method with applications to several types of options.

Firms that substantially increase capital investments subsequently achieve negative benchmark-adjusted returns. The negative abnormal capital investment/return relation is shown to be stronger for firms that have greater investment discretion, i.e., firms with higher cash flows and lower debt ratios, and is shown to be significant only in time periods when hostile takeovers were less prevalent. These observations are consistent with the hypothesis that investors tend to underreact to the empire building implications of increased investment expenditures. Although firms that increase capital investments tend to have high past returns and often issue equity, the negative abnormal capital investment/return relation is independent of the previously documented long-term return reversal and secondary equity issue anomalies.