Knowledge that Transforms

We analyze the effects of venture capital (VC) backing on profitability of private firm acquisitions. We find that VC backing leads to significantly higher acquirer announcement returns, averaging 3%, even after controlling for deal characteristics and endogeneity of venture funding. This leads us to investigate whether some VCs have interests that conflict with those of other investors. We show that such conflicts arise from VCs having financial relationships with both acquirers and targets, corporate VCs having a dominant strategic focus, and VC funds nearing maturity experiencing pressure to liquidate. Our conclusions follow from examinations of target takeover premia and acquirer announcement returns.

We find direct evidence that institutions increase round-trip stock trades, increase average commissions per share, and pay unusually high commissions on some trades in order to send abnormally high commissions to the lead underwriters of profitable initial public offerings (IPOs). These excess commission payments are a particularly effective way for transient investors to receive lucrative IPO allocations. Our results suggest that the underwriter’s concern for their long-term client relationships limits the payment-for-IPO practice. We estimate that abnormal commission payments are large for the most profitable issues, and that an additional $1 excess commission payment to the lead underwriter results in $2.21 in investor profits from allocated shares.

Using a large sample of hedge fund manager characteristics, we provide one of the first comprehensive studies on the impact of manager characteristics, such as education and career concern, on hedge fund performances. We document differential ability among hedge fund managers in either generating risk-adjusted returns or running hedge funds as a business. In particular, we find that managers from higher-SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) undergraduate institutions tend to have higher raw and risk-adjusted returns, more inflows, and take fewer risks. Unlike mutual funds, we find a rather symmetric relation between hedge fund flows and past performance, and that hedge fund flows do not have a significant negative impact on future performance.

This paper proposes a measure of ex ante equity premium, IPOFDR, which is the average difference between the initial public offering (IPO) offer price and the 1st-trading-day close price. I test the idea in 3 ways. First, there is a positive relation between IPOFDR and future market returns. Second, changes in IPOFDR help explain the cross section of stock returns. Third, the predictive power of IPOFDR for stock returns reflects mainly its close relation with market variance and average idiosyncratic variance—arguably measures of systematic risk. These results cast doubt on the notion that the IPO 1st-day return is a measure of investor sentiment.

We propose a model that links a firm’s decision to go public with its subsequent takeover strategy. A private bidder does not know a firm’s true valuation, which affects its gain from a potential takeover. Consequently, a private bidder pursues a suboptimal restructuring policy. An alternative route is to complete an initial public offering (IPO) first. An IPO reduces valuation uncertainty, leading to a more efficient acquisition strategy, therefore enhancing firm value. We calibrate the model using data on IPOs and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The resulting comparative statics generate several novel qualitative and quantitative predictions, which complement the predictions of other theories linking IPOs and M&As. For example, the time it takes a newly public firm to attempt an acquisition of another firm is expected to increase in the degree of valuation uncertainty prior to the firm’s IPO and in the cost of going public, and it is expected to decrease in the valuation surprise realized at the time of the IPO. We find strong empirical support for the model’s predictions.

Staleness in measured prices imparts a positive statistical bias and a negative dilution effect on mutual fund performance. First, evaluating performance with nonsynchronous data generates a spurious component of alpha. Second, stale prices create arbitrage opportunities for high-frequency traders whose trades dilute the portfolio returns and hence fund performance. This paper introduces a model that evaluates fund performance while controlling directly for these biases. Empirical tests of the model show that alpha net of these biases is on average positive although not significant and about 40 basis points higher than alpha measured without controlling for the impacts of stale pricing. The difference between the net alpha and the measured alpha consists of 3 components: a statistical bias, the dilution effect of long-term fund flows, and the dilution effect of arbitrage flows. Whereas the former 2 components are small, the latter is large and widespread in the fund industry.

Using a unique database of aggregate daily flows to equity mutual funds in Israel, we find strong support for the “temporary price pressure hypothesis” regarding mutual fund flows: Mutual fund flows create temporary price pressure that is subsequently corrected. We find that flows are positively autocorrelated, and are correlated with market returns ( R 2 of 20%). Our main finding is that approximately one-half of the price change is reversed within 10 trading days. This support for the “temporary price pressure hypothesis” complements microstructure research concerning price impact and price noise in stocks by indicating price noise at the aggregate market level.

In this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity and the impact of agency problems from free cash flow (FCF) on this effect. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights have a significantly lower implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, price momentum, analysts’ forecast biases, and industry and year effects than do firms with weak shareholder rights. Further analysis shows that the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity is significantly stronger for firms with more severe agency problems from FCFs.

Previous studies of Treasury market illiquidity span short time periods and focus on particular maturities. In contrast, we study the time series of illiquidity for different maturities over an extended period of time. We also compare time-series determinants of on-the-run and off-the-run illiquidity. Illiquidity increases and the difference between spreads of long- and short-term bonds significantly widens during recessions, suggesting a “flight to liquidity,” wherein investors shift into the more liquid short-term bonds during economic contractions. Macroeconomic variables such as inflation and federal funds rates forecast off-the-run illiquidity significantly but have only modest forecasting ability for on-the-run illiquidity. Bond returns across maturities are forecastable by off-the-run but not on-the-run bond illiquidity. Thus, off-the-run illiquidity, by reflecting macro shocks first, is the primary source of the liquidity premium in the Treasury market.

Funding risk measures the extent to which a fund can borrow money by posting collateral. Using a novel measure of funding risk based on futures margins, we are able to empirically identify the mechanism by which changes in funding risk affect the likelihood of contagion. An increase in margins of the order of magnitude observed during the subprime crisis increases the probability of contagion among certain types of funds by up to 34%. Our analysis shows that some types of hedge funds are more vulnerable to contagion than others. Our results also suggest that policies that limit the magnitude of changes in margins over short periods of time may reduce the likelihood of contagion among hedge funds.