Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract A diversified firm can trade at a discount to a matched portfolio of single-segment firms if the diversified firm has either lower expected cash flows or higher expected returns than the single-segment firms. We study whether firms with diversification discounts have higher expected returns in order to compensate investors for offering less upside potential (or skewness exposure) than focused firms. Our empirical tests support this hypothesis. First, we find that focused firms offer greater skewness exposure than diversified firms. Second, we find that diversified firms have significantly larger discounts when the diversified firm offers less skewness than matched single-segment firms. Finally, we find that up to 53% of the excess returns received on diversification-discount firms relative to diversification-premium firms can be explained by differences in exposure to skewness.

Abstract Deviations from put-call parity contain information about future stock returns. Using the difference in implied volatility between pairs of call and put options to measure these deviations, we find that stocks with relatively expensive calls outperform stocks with relatively expensive puts by 50 basis points per week. We find both positive abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive calls and negative abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive puts, which cannot be explained by short sale constraints. Rebate rates from the stock lending market directly confirm that our findings are not driven by stocks that are hard to borrow. The degree of predictability is larger when option liquidity is high and stock liquidity low, while there is little predictability when the opposite is true. Controlling for size, option prices are more likely to deviate from strict put-call parity when underlying stocks face more information risk. The degree of predictability decreases over the sample period. Our results are consistent with mispricing during the earlier years of the study, with a gradual reduction of the mispricing over time.

Abstract This paper offers a rational explanation for the puzzling empirical fact that stock returns decrease with an increase in the volatility of liquidity. We model liquidity as a stochastic price impact process and define the liquidity premium as the additional return necessary to compensate a multiperiod investor for the adverse price impact of trading. The model demonstrates that a fully rational, utility maximizing, risk-averse investor can take advantage of time-varying liquidity by adapting his trades to the state of liquidity. We provide new empirical evidence supportive of the model.

Using an extensive cross-section of US corporate CDS this paper offers an economic understanding of implied loss given default (LGD) and jumps in default risk. We formulate and underpin empirical stylized facts about CDS spreads, which are then reproduced in our affine intensity-based jump-diffusion model. Implied LGD is well identified, with obligors possessing substantial tangible assets expected to recover more. Sudden increases in the default risk of investment-grade obligors are higher relative to speculative grade. The probability of structural migration to default is low for investment-grade and heavily regulated obligors because investors fear distress rather through rare but devastating events. (authors' abstract)

Abstract We study the consumption-investment problem of an agent with a constant relative risk aversion preference function, who possesses noisy information about the future prospects of a stock. We also solve for the value of information to the agent in closed form. We find that information can significantly alter consumption and asset allocation decisions. For reasonable parameter ranges, information increases consumption in the vicinity of 25%. Information can shift the portfolio weight on a stock from 0% to around 70%. Thus, depending on the stock beta, the weight on the market portfolio can be considerably reduced with information, causing the appearance of underdiversification. The model indicates that stock holdings of informed agents are positively related to wealth, unrelated to systematic risk, and negatively related to idiosyncratic uncertainty. We also show that the dollar value of information to the agent depends linearly on his wealth and decreases with both the propensity to intermediate consumption and risk aversion.

Abstract We find that the market’s recent cross-sectional dispersion in stock returns is positively related to the subsequent value book-to-market premium and negatively related to the subsequent momentum premium. The partial relation between return dispersion (RD) and the subsequent value and momentum premiums remains strong when controlling for macroeconomic state variables suggested by the literature. Our findings are consistent with recent theoretical insights and empirical evidence that suggest that the market’s RD may serve as a leading countercyclical state variable, that the value premium is countercyclical, and that the momentum premium is procyclical.

Abstract Option pricing models and longer-term value-at-risk (VaR) models generally require volatility forecasts over horizons considerably longer than the data frequency. The typical recursive procedure for generating longer-term forecasts keeps the relative weights of recent and older observations the same for all forecast horizons. In contrast, we find that older observations are relatively more important in forecasting at longer horizons. We find that the Ederington and Guan (2005) model and a modified EGARCH (exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic) model in which parameter values vary with the forecast horizon forecast better out-of-sample than the GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic), EGARCH, and Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (GJR) models across a wide variety of markets and forecast horizons.

Abstract While the signaling hypothesis has played a prominent role as the economic rationale associated with the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing puzzle (Welch (1989)), the empirical evidence on it has been mixed at best (Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993), Michaely and Shaw (1994)). This paper revisits the issue from the vantage point of close to two decades of additional experience by examining a sample of foreign IPOs—firms from both financially integrated and segmented markets—in U.S. markets. The evidence indicates that signaling does matter in determining IPO underpricing, especially for firms domiciled in countries with segmented markets, which as a result face higher information asymmetry and lack access to external capital markets. We find a significant positive and robust relationship between the degree of IPO underpricing and segmented-market firms’ seasoned equity offering (SEO) activities. For firms from integrated markets, in contrast, the analyst-coverage purchase hypothesis appears to matter more in explaining IPO underpricing, and the aftermarket price appreciation explains these firms’ SEO activities. The evidence, therefore, clearly supports the notion that some firms are willing to leave money on the table voluntarily to get a more favorable price at seasoned offerings when they are substantially wealth constrained, a prediction embedded in the signaling hypothesis.

Abstract We examine the potential profits of trading on a measure of private information (PIN) in a stock. A zero-investment portfolio that is size-neutral but long in high PIN stocks and short in low PIN stocks earns a significant abnormal return. The Fama-French, momentum, and liquidity factors do not explain this return. However, significant covariation in returns exists among high PIN stocks and among low PIN stocks, suggesting that PIN might proxy for an underlying factor. We create a PIN factor as the monthly return on the zero-investment portfolio above and show that it is successful in explaining returns to independent PIN-size portfolios. We also show that it is robust to inclusion of the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity factor and the Amihud illiquidity factor. We argue that information remains an important determinant of asset returns even in the presence of these additional factors.

Abstract Aggregate idiosyncratic volatility spiked nearly fivefold during the Internet boom of the late 1990s, dwarfing in magnitude a moderately increasing trend. While some researchers argue that this rise in idiosyncratic risk was the result of changes in the characteristics of public firms, others argue that it was driven by the changing sentiment of irrational traders. We present evidence that the marketwide decline in maturity of the typical public firm can explain most of the increase in firm-specific risk during the Internet boom. Controlling for firm maturity, we find no evidence that investor sentiment drives idiosyncratic risk throughout the Internet boom.