Knowledge that Transforms

An assimilation bias occurs when people’s evaluative judgment is positively influenced by a previously observed signal. We study this effect by examining investors’ appraisal of M&A deals announced 1 day after other firms in the same 1-digit SIC as the merging parties release earnings surprises. Consistent with assimilation effects, acquirers’ M&A announcement stock return initially correlates with the previous day’s earnings surprises. This effect reverses after 1 week. Assimilation generates other distortions as more positive surprises are related to increases in bid competition, takeover premiums, and withdrawn M&As. Evidence from IPOs corroborates the presence of assimilation effects in financial markets.

We use the staggered enactment of anti-recharacterization laws as a plausibly exogenous shock to the value of securitizing collateral through special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and test how collateral values impact corporate risk management. Following the laws’ enactment, we find increases in commodity, foreign exchange, and interest rate hedging, especially for firms with exposure to these risks and that rely on SPVs. Supporting the collateral constraints literature, the effect is weaker for firms that likely need the collateral for external financing, such as financially constrained firms. Our findings highlight fluctuations in collateral values as an important consideration in risk management decisions.

In a rich, calibrated life-cycle model, we show that well-designed mandatory pension plans significantly improve the welfare of individuals procrastinating on savings, and even improve most rational individuals’ welfare through a return tax advantage and fair annuitization. For a group of heterogeneous savers, in terms of preferences and sophistication, the best plan has contributions of 10% of income from age 30, a glidepath investment strategy, payouts following a variable lifelong annuity, and options to choose a different investment strategy and to modify the annuitization feature. This plan generates an average welfare gain of $175,000 per individual.

While corporate social responsibility by firms aims at improving welfare for different social groups, whether it achieves this is often difficult to measure. After Apr. 2018 protests, Starbucks enacted policies that anybody could sit in their stores and use the bathroom without making a purchase. Using anonymized cellphone location data, we estimate this led to a 7.0% decline in attendance relative to other nearby coffee shops. The effect is 84% larger near homeless shelters and larger for Starbucks’ wealthier customers. The average time spent per visit declined by 4.1%. Public urination citations decreased near Starbucks locations, but other minor crimes were unchanged.

We find that organization capital is negatively related to the cost of bank loans. This finding is robust to additional analyses including those that address omitted variable bias and reverse causality. In addition, we find that organization capital reduces all-in-spread-undrawn. When we decompose the bank loan cost, we find that organization capital increases facility fees due to its risk-engendering characteristics. Finally, we find that organization capital is positively associated with a high likelihood of the presence of inventors and innovation output, consistent with the argument that organization capital is embedded in the key talent within a firm.

Hand-collecting credit line drawdowns that firms classify as long-term debt, we first document how long-term drawdowns rise with high investment needs or weak external capital market conditions. Nearly all drawdown proceeds finance long-term investment, including M&A activity. Unrated and lower-rated firms rely more on long-term drawdowns than high or very poorly rated firms. We further find that credit lines have tighter covenants than terms loans. Drawdowns are repaid fairly quickly and often refinanced with other long-term debt. Our findings support the monitored liquidity insurance theory of credit lines and highlight that long-term drawdowns act as a valuable bridge financing mechanism.

Previous literature finds anomalies are at least as prevalent in developed markets as in emerging markets; namely, the global anomaly puzzle. We show that while market development and information diffusion are linearly related, information diffusion has a nonlinear impact on anomalies. This is consistent with theoretical developments concerning the process of information diffusion. In extremely low-efficiency regimes, without newswatchers sowing the seeds of price discovery and ensuring the long-run convergence of price to fundamentals, initial mispricing and subsequent correction will not occur. The concentration of emerging countries in low-efficiency regimes provides an explanation to the puzzle.

This study uncovers how household investors intensify the effect of the 52-week high (52WH): increased volume and momentum-like returns at the 52WH price. Using daily household and institutional trading data, we find that households sharply increase their selling, particularly with limit orders at the 52WH price. This behavior is indicative of anchoring, as it is robust to past returns and intensified by proximity, market uncertainty, and salience of the 52WH. This uninformed limit order selling at and prior to the 52WH leads to a doubling of unconditional 52WH anomaly returns. Post-event returns benefit institutions, which act as counterparties.

We examine how creditor rights affect the trade-off between non-debt and debt tax shields. Using four bankruptcy reforms and a panel of private and public firms from Italy, we show that laws empowering creditors reduce tax avoidance and increase debt financing, consistent with firms substituting non-debt tax shields with debt tax shields. We corroborate the validity of our findings using a panel of public firms across 33 countries. Additionally, we document that the impact of creditor protection laws is mitigated by tax system characteristics, which significantly reduce the incentives to substitute tax avoidance with debt.

Economically insignificant tick sizes encourage undercutting behavior, thus harming market quality. Theoretical work shows that increasing tick sizes in unconstrained markets reduces undercutting and improves market quality. Equity market pricing grids are generally too coarse to test this prediction. We examine a cryptocurrency market with infinitesimal tick sizes where undercutting limit orders acquire price priority without meaningful economic cost. We show that increasing tick sizes reduces undercutting behavior, increases liquidity provision and quoted depth, and reduces transaction costs for institutional and retail-sized trades while decreasing short-term volatility. Tiny tick sizes are suboptimal, supporting increased minimum trading increments in tick-unconstrained markets.