Knowledge that Transforms

While the causal impact of limited attention to macroeconomic news is difficult to detect, this article proposes one solution: exploiting when foreign investors are “distracted” by risk factors in their home markets. I demonstrate that financial activity in the average foreign investor’s home market decreases foreign attention paid to 21 emerging economies, measured using Google search volume for economy-specific financial terms that emanate from outside each economy’s border. Exploiting this effect using an instrumental variables approach, I find that an exogenous increase in foreign attention preceding a scheduled monetary policy rate announcement raises preannouncement stock returns and announcement day turnover.

U.S. equity exchanges have experienced a dramatic increase in competition from new entrants, resulting in the fragmentation of trading across venues. While market quality has generally improved over this period, we show most of the improvements have accrued to the largest stocks. We then show this bifurcation in market quality is related to the fragmentation of trading. Theoretically, more exchange competition should reduce trading costs, yet it may also increase adverse selection for liquidity providers, leading to higher spreads. We document evidence of both effects (fragmentation improves market quality for large stocks while small stocks experience relatively worse quality).

Do limitations on commissions paid to financial advisers reduce prices of financial products and stimulate investment? I examine these questions by estimating the causal effects of regulating commissions for mutual fund distribution. I exploit the unique institutional setting in Israel and the 2013 policy change when the government reduced commissions differently for different fund types. The reform led to a major decline in fund expense ratios and a consequent increase in fund flows. Funds with price-sensitive investors experienced 35% larger inflows. I interpret these results as investor responses to price competition fostered by a reduction in distribution costs.

This article examines the effect of board governance on investment efficiency. I use the staggered enactment of board reforms in 41 countries as a shock to board structure that exogenously improves the quality of board oversight of managers. I find that investment-Q sensitivity improves by roughly half post-reform. This effect is more pronounced for firms that are more exposed to the reforms or when external governance mechanisms are less likely to discipline managers. These findings suggest that increased board oversight strengthens managers’ incentives to make investment decisions that are more in line with their firms’ growth opportunities.

We present a dynamic, continuous-time model in which risk averse inside equityholders set a bank’s lending, payout, and financing policies, and the exposure of bank assets to crashes. We examine whether bailouts encourage excessive lending and risk taking compared to liquidation or bail-ins with debt-to-equity conversion or debt write-downs. The effects of the prevailing insolvency resolution mechanism (IRM) on the probability of insolvency, loss in default, and the bank’s value suggest no single IRM is a panacea. We show how a bailout fund financed through a tax on bank dividends resolves bailouts without public money and without distorting insiders’ incentives.

This paper provides the first evidence of positive bank-to-bank spillovers. I show that geographic linkages between banks that engage in home lending in the same geographic region transmit positive shocks from one bank to another. I exploit shocks to the deposit base of banks located in counties experiencing shale oil booms and show that a nonshocked bank in a nonboom county expands lending more if its linkages have greater exposure to shale booms. Results show that the shock exposure of linkages has a positive impact on home prices of nonboom counties, and nonshocked banks located therein respond with increased lending.

Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, excluding misconduct firms, creating a short-term spillover that averages $92.7 billion losses per year. We examine an expansive set of channels under which this spillover to nontarget firms can occur, and find that it reflects the loss of the embedded value of monitoring by a common institutional owner, enforcement wave activity, and industry peer and business relationships. Institutional investors also experience a significant abnormal outflow of funds in the year following the misconduct event.

I examine the impact of the opioid epidemic on subprime auto lending. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that county-level increases in opioid abuse cause an increase in loan defaults. Moreover, I find that traditional credit scoring attributes (e.g., FICO score) fail to predict loan performance deterioration associated with opioid addiction. The weak predictive performance of traditional credit measures and the resulting higher default rates generate a negative externality for borrowers in opioid-afflicted areas, as evidenced by 5.7% higher loan costs for subprime borrowers.

Liquidity trading following mutual fund outflows creates a potentially powerful empirical setting in which stock price variation is unrelated to changes in firm fundamentals. Instrumental variables (IVs) drawn from this setting impose an additional assumption that managers sell firms in proportion to portfolio weights. I show that this assumption causes selection bias in these IVs. It misallocates large price impacts to poorly performing, illiquid firms with lower growth – firms that managers systematically avoid selling. Simulations show that selection bias doubles the magnitude of regression coefficients and precludes potential fixes. Numerous recent studies exploiting these IVs should be reevaluated.

An important literature emphasizes that finance grew rapidly after WWII relative to the full economy and the services sector, but these are poor benchmarks because they mask a broad structural shift from low- to high-skill services. We show that i) finance is among the most skill-intensive service industries, ii) the evolution of the finance income share closely tracks other high-skill service industries, and iii) finance grew much slower than the rest of high-skill services in the post-WWII period. The rise of modern finance is not as remarkable as prior research suggests, providing context for debates about the size of finance.