Knowledge that Transforms

We identify a new mechanism of opportunistic insider trading linked to attention-driven mispricing. Insiders are more likely to sell their company’s stock during periods of heightened retail attention and more inclined to buy when attention diminishes. The results are particularly pronounced for lottery-type stocks and firms with substantial retail ownership. We demonstrate that our findings—which relate to indicators of mispricing, retail order imbalances, and Robinhood herding episodes—extend to seasoned equity issuances and cannot be solely explained by firm fundamentals. Attention-based insider trading is less likely to result in SEC enforcement actions and persists across different regulatory regimes.

This paper studies the impact of limited attention on investment decisions by venture capitalists (VCs). I find that startups funded by VCs during VCs’ IPO engagements tend to underperform: These startups are 9% less likely to go public or become acquired and have lower exit multiples. The effects of VCs’ busyness cluster around the active phase of the IPO engagement and are more pronounced in cases of higher workload intensity or higher information asymmetry. Overall, this performance gap induced by attention constraints provides new evidence on VCs’ ability to identify investment opportunities at the initial screening stage.

We demonstrate that investment income taxes incentivize capital allocation to the ecofriendly green sector away from the non-ecofriendly brown sector in a stylized economy. This tax reduces the arrival intensity of climate disasters, delivers the socially optimal allocation, and can be jointly implemented with a carbon tax, expanding policymakers’ toolkit to reduce climate disasters. Extending the model with heterogeneous investors, we show that investment income taxes can obtain support from a political majority and thereby relax political constraints faced by a carbon tax alone.

We highlight an important but overlooked characteristic of financial fragility: “Fragile” stocks command higher liquidity. This reduces their sensitivity to corporate actions with price impact and affects the firms’ incentives to engage in such actions. We show that fragile firms have lower share repurchases, issue more equity, and invest more. We establish causality by relating changes in corporate actions to exogenous changes in fragility induced by mergers of asset managers. Our results suggest that financial fragility has direct but unexpected real implications for corporate actions.

“Stealth mergers” are not reported to the government because they fall below the required size threshold. We study stealth mergers involving public targets for which manipulation of transaction sizes is unlikely. These stealth mergers result in less R&D spending, patenting, and capital expenditures, and in lower value patents for both acquiring firms and their competitors relative to non-stealth mergers. Industry concentration increases, and product market competition decreases for stealth acquirers. Stealth acquirers and their competitors earn higher cumulative abnormal returns relative to non-stealth mergers. Our results suggest more government scrutiny is warranted for stealth mergers.

We propose a consumption-based model to explain puzzling unstable (i.e., sometimes positive and sometimes negative) relations between stock market variance with both stock market risk premia and prices. In the model, market risk premia depend positively (negatively) on fear (euphoria) variance. Market prices, which decrease with discount rates, correlate negatively (positively) with fear (euphoria) variance. Because it is the sum of fear and euphoria variances, the market variance may correlate positively or negatively with expected returns and prices, depending on the relative importance of the two variances. Our empirical results support the model’s key assumptions and many novel implications.

We find that capital investment and net debt issuance of large firms are, on average, more sensitive to industry business cycles than those of small firms, in stark contrast to the effect of size on investment sensitivity to macroeconomic cycles. We theoretically examine the role of firm size on firms’ responses to industry shocks. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that large firms exhibit greater sensitivity to industry cycles than small firms in their investment and net debt issuance only in industries with low cyclical variability of markups and production growth, high fixed cost intensity, high market-to-book, and high markups.

Using comprehensive account-level data, we separate Chinese retail investors into 5 groups and document strong heterogeneity in trading dynamics and performances. Retail investors with smaller account sizes cannot predict future returns correctly, display daily momentum patterns, fail to process public news, and show overconfidence and gambling preferences, while retail investors with larger account balances predict future returns correctly, display contrarian patterns, and incorporate public news in trading. Using performance measures established in previous literature, we find that smaller retail investors suffer from poor stock selection abilities and trading costs, while large retail investors’ stock selection abilities are offset by trading costs.

We show that the negative relation between real investments and future stock returns is primarily driven by the subsample of firms building additional capacity. We develop a real options model to rationalize that evidence based on the premise that firms need to learn how to best operate modern capacity vintages, inducing idiosyncratic uncertainty in that capacity’s production costs over the learning period. Conversely, the uncertainty lowers the expected return of firms with newly built capacity until it is resolved. Further evidence based on profit sensitivities to aggregate conditions; analyst forecast-error volatilities; and high- versus low-tech industry subsamples supports our uncertainty explanation.

A novel arbitrage-free model of nominal U.S. Treasuries that decomposes yields into frictionless expected rates, frictionless term premiums, and liquidity premiums produces four key results from Jan. 1987 to Aug. 2023. First, liquidity loadings are larger than for the slope and higher-order principal components. Second, the countercyclicality of required nominal Treasury returns owes to liquidity, if anything, not frictionless term premiums. Third, Federal Reserve large-scale asset purchases generally work through expected rates and frictionless term premiums, not liquidity premiums. Fourth, given similar estimates using TIPS, inflation expectations are less moored around the Federal Reserve’s price objectives than other models say.