Knowledge that Transforms

Prior research shows that splitting firms earn positive abnormal returns and that they experience an increase in stock return volatility. By examining option-implied volatility, we assess option traders’ perceptions on return and volatility changes arising from stock splits. We find that they do expect higher volatility following splits. There is only weak evidence, though, of option traders anticipating an abnormal increase in stock prices. We also show that our option measures can predict both stock volatility levels and changes after the announcement. However, there is little evidence that they can predict the returns of splitting firms.

Corporate bond returns exhibit predictability in a manner consistent with efficient pricing. Many equity characteristics, such as accruals, standardized unexpected earnings, and idiosyncratic volatility, do not impact bond returns. Profitability and asset growth are negatively related to corporate bond returns. Because firms that are profitable or have high asset growth (and hence more collateral) should be less risky, with lower required returns, the evidence accords with the risk–reward paradigm. Past equity returns are positively related to bond returns, indicating that equities lead bonds. Cross-sectional bond return predictors generally do not provide materially high Sharpe ratios after accounting for trading costs.

We examine commercial real estate fund managers’ abilities to generate abnormal profits through selection of outperforming property submarket segments or through the timing of entry into and exit from submarkets. The vast majority of portfolio managers exhibit little market timing ability, with the exception of non-NYSE real estate investment trusts after the financial crisis. A substantial fraction of managers seems able to successfully select property submarkets. Selection performance exhibits significant persistence. Managers that are active in more liquid markets tend to exhibit better timing performance, while managers exhibiting better selection ability appear to be active in less liquid markets.

We analyze the flow of money between mutual fund categories, finding strong evidence of seasonality in investor risk aversion. Aggregate investor flow data reveal an investor preference for safe mutual funds in autumn and risky funds in spring. During September alone, outflows from equity funds average $13 billion, controlling for previously documented flow determinants (e.g., capital-gains overhang). This movement of large amounts of money between fund categories is correlated with seasonality in investor risk aversion, consistent with investors preferring safer (riskier) investments in autumn (spring). We find consistent evidence in Canada and also in Australia, where seasons are offset by 6 months.

Equity index volatility variation and its interaction with the index return can come from three distinct channels. First, index volatility increases with the market’s aggregate financial leverage. Second, positive shocks to systematic risk increase the cost of capital and reduce the valuation of future cash flows, generating a negative correlation between the index return and its volatility, regardless of financial leverage. Finally, large negative market disruptions show self-exciting behaviors. This article proposes a model that incorporates all three channels and examines their relative contribution to index option pricing and stock option pricing for different types of companies.

I model the decision of an informed early-stage venture capital (VC) investor that considers involving an uninformed VC or venture lending (VL) investor to finance the late stage. Early-stage VC investors that own high-quality value companies tend to signal their quality and they frequently turn to VL investors. Early-stage VC investors prefer VC if the proportion of high-quality companies in the population is high, if their companies have a high upside potential, if they can benefit from the value that late-stage VC investors add, or if uncertainty is high. I find empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.

We model conditional market beta and alpha as flexible functions of state variables identified via a formal variable-selection procedure. In the post-1963 sample, the beta of the value premium comoves strongly with unemployment, inflation, and the price–earnings ratio in a countercyclical manner. We also uncover a novel nonlinear dependence of alpha on business conditions: It falls sharply and even becomes negative during severe economic downturns but is positive and flat otherwise. The conditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) performs better than the unconditional CAPM, but this does not fully explain the value premium. Our findings are consistent with a conditional CAPM with rare disasters.

This research examines the relationship between policy uncertainty and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that policy uncertainty is negatively related to firm acquisitiveness and positively related to the time it takes to complete M&A deals. In addition, policy uncertainty motivates acquirers to use stock for payment and to pay lower bid premiums. Acquirers, on average, create larger shareholder value from M&A deals undertaken during periods of high policy uncertainty, which is attributable to their prudence as well as the wealth transfer from the financially constrained targets to acquirers.

We examine whether financing commitments from a target firm’s financial advisor, in the form of stapled financing, provide certification of target value. Using a data set of leveraged buyouts spanning 2002–2011, and addressing endogeneity issues, we find that stapled financing has significant positive effects on sellers’ shareholder wealth, especially for targets suffering from greater adverse selection. Stapled financing facilitates deal financing by allowing buyers to obtain lower-cost and longer-maturity debt, and it is positively associated with bidding intensity. Investment banks offering stapled financing appear to trade off higher expected advisory fees against loss of lending efficiency ex post.

This article analyzes the informative trading of professional money managers within a rational-expectations equilibrium model in which managers care about their performance relative to their peer group. I find that the existence of uninformed managers causes informed managers with relative performance concerns to trade less informatively, engendering less informative prices. When managers are differentially informed, they need to forecast the average performance based on private signals, and each manager may place more weight on the private signal if the signal provides good information about the average performance. The price aggregates those signals and thus becomes more informative.