We evaluate the link between chief executive officer (CEO) industry tournament incentives (ITIs) and the product-market benefits of corporate liquidity. We find that ITIs increase the level and marginal value of cash holdings. Furthermore, ITIs strengthen the relation between excess cash and market-share gains, especially for firms that face significant competitive threats. Additionally, for firms with excess cash, higher ITIs lead to increased research and development (R&D) expenses, capital expenditures, and spending on focused acquisitions as well as reduced payouts. Overall, our findings suggest that ITIs increase the value of cash by incentivizing CEOs to deploy cash strategically to capture its product-market benefits.

We study at-the-market (ATM) equity offerings, which are direct share issuances sold in the secondary market that forgo underwriters and “dribble-out” shares over time rather than raising them all at once. Enabled in 2008, their use has increased dramatically, and in 2016, their incidence and total proceeds were, respectively, 63% and 26% of those for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Determinants of firms’ choice between ATMs and SEOs are consistent with the costly certification hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). We also find that 65% of ATM proceeds are used to stockpile cash compared to 84% of SEO proceeds.

We investigate the relationship between traders’ expectations and market outcomes with experimental asset market data. The data show that those who have high price expectations buy more frequently and submit higher bids, and those who hold low price expectations sell more frequently and submit lower bids. Traders who have more accurate expectations achieve greater earnings. Simulations using only belief data reproduce the pricing patterns observed in the market well, indicating that the heterogeneity of expectations is a key to explaining market activity.