Avner Kalay, Signaling, Information Content, and the Reluctance to Cut Dividends, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 4, Proceedings of 15th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 19-21, 1980, San Diego, California (Nov., 1980), pp. 855-869

Avner Kalay, Comment: Haugen and Senbet Paper, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 4, Proceedings of 14th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 21-23, 1979 (Nov., 1979), pp. 711-714

We develop a measure (based on the relative slopes of the demand and supply schedules) quantifying the asymmetric presence of liquidity traders in the market: a steeper slope of the demand (supply) schedule indicates a concentration of liquidity traders on the demand (supply) side. Using the opening session of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, we demonstrate the predictive power of our measure. Consistent with theory, we find that the concentration of liquidity traders on the demand (supply) side is negatively (positively) correlated with future returns. We find that liquidity traders are likely to arrive at the market together (commonality).

In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller [11], [12] demonstrate that if capital markets are perfect and investment policy is held constant, the market value of the firm is independent of its financial decisions. Furthermore, if capital markets are perfect, stockholders have incentive to choose the investment policy which maximizes the market value of the firm (see [6]). Motivated by this assumption, the firm has been viewed as a “black box;” namely, as one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value. However, in a growing body of recent literature (see [1], [2], [7], [9], [13], and [14]), researchers recognize that the firm in an “imperfect” capital market is a collection of groups whose interests can, and do, conflict. Jensen and Meckling [9] study the roles of three important groups—the owner-manager, the stockholders, and the bondholders—focusing on the potential costs resulting from divergence of interests among them. They provide a theory of optimal capital structure in terms of reducing the costs of these conflicts.