We examine the role of shareholder takeup in rights offerings on the subscription period price reaction and liquidity. Our results indicate that takeup information is reflected in price adjustments over the subscription period and that quality-related information disclosed on the rights announcement date further impacts prices in this period. Higher shareholder takeup improves liquidity. We do find some evidence of inefficiencies in the adjustment process over the subscription period that, in part, is consistent with a model where markets are characterized by overconfident investors and that also articulates with takeup information arriving in the market.

We find a positive relation between the amount of pension deficits and the cost of bank loans. The effect of pension deficits on the cost of bank loans is driven by financial constraints, information-asymmetry problems, and higher pension-investment risk. Banks tighten lending terms for firms with larger pension deficits by requiring collateral, increasing the number of loan covenants, and shortening loan maturity. Borrowers with larger pension deficits are also more likely to violate covenants in the future. Collectively, these findings indicate that pension deficits represent an additional source of risk priced by banks.