We model the employee incentive problem jointly with a firm’s exit decision. Our model predicts that firms in industries where human capital is important are more likely to go public and use high-powered, stock-based compensation. We also show that the higher the management quality, the more likely a firm is to go public than to be acquired. Regarding life cycle, a firm with high capital intensity and/or high management quality will choose to go public at a younger age.

Abstract We test for the presence of a systematic tail risk premium in the cross section of expected returns by applying a measure of the sensitivity of assets to extreme market downturns, the tail beta. Empirically, historical tail betas help predict the future performance of stocks in extreme market downturns. During a market crash, stocks with historically high tail betas suffer losses that are approximately 2 to 3 times larger than their low-tail-beta counterparts. However, we find no evidence of a premium associated with tail betas. The theoretically additive and empirically persistent tail betas can help assess portfolio tail risks.

Abstract This paper examines the style-based feedback trading behavior of U.S. mutual fund managers. We provide an empirical version of Barberis and Shleifer’s style-switching model. We find style-based feedback trading for 77% of the funds, half of which is positive (negative) feedback trading. There is evidence for “twin style” switching, where capital is channeled between value and growth, and between large- and small-cap. Growth (value) funds apply more positive (negative) feedback trading. Funds that switch more aggressively are younger and have higher expense ratios. Finally, we find that positive (negative) feedback trading yields positive (negative) alpha.