We document firms often determine CEO equity grants based on a predetermined dollar value (value-based equity grant) instead of on the number of shares (share-based grant). Value-based equity grants weaken the relationship between stock performance and CEO equity pay, lower CEO portfolio delta, and slow firms’ investment in R&D. We find that retention pressure is a key reason for the use of value-based equity pay, while governance could also matter. Overall, this paper alerts boards to the unintended consequences of pursuing a target pay level or pay structure because such practices can lead to value-based equity grants in CEO compensation.

Using high-frequency data on over 7 million import transactions, we study the disruptions to U.S. firms’ trade patterns and growth immediately following the initial COVID-19 trade shock. While large firms were not direct recipients of government fiscal support, they experienced fewer disruptions when located in counties where small businesses (SMEs) received government stimulus loans under the Paycheck Protection Program. These effects were largest in counties with greater share of SMEs and stronger input–output linkages between large firms and SMEs. Our results point to local spillovers between SMEs and large firms as being an important determinant of firm resiliency during crises.