The idea that various characteristics of financial contracts and institutions can be explained as a rational response to problems created by information asymmetries has received a great deal of attention recently. A central theme of the literature in this area is that while moral hazard may hamper the direct transfer of information between market participants, information may be conveyed indirectly through the actions of market participants. For example, the characteristics of the insurance contract purchased may convey information as to riskiness of the insured. Recognition of the possible effects of information asymmetries has provided valuable insights into the role of financial intermediaries and the characteristics of the contracts they offer. In this paper we apply this literature to an analysis of the market for bank loan commitments. Through our analysis we are able to explain the use of various payment options such as fees and compensating balance requirements associated with loan commitments. Extensions of our analysis into the pricing of other bank services are also explored.

This paper examines the relationship between a firm’s exposure to industry downturns that we call industry risk and bank loan pricing. We measure industry risk based on the relationship between a firm’s stock returns and industry returns conditional on an industry downturn. We find industry risk is significantly related to the recovery rates in bankruptcy and the likelihood of the firm experiencing financial distress when its peers are also in distress. More importantly, we find that the spreads on unsecured bank loans are positively related to industry risk measures. These relationships are stronger for firms with more industry-specific assets.

We examine how analysts establish target prices for IPO firms and whether comparable firms used to support target prices are helpful in explaining IPO offer prices. During the bubble period of 1999 to 2000, the average offer price was set at a discount relative to comparable firm valuations. In contrast, the average offer price was set at a small premium relative to comparables in the pre-bubble period. This shift appears to hold even after controlling for the differences in the types of firms going public during the bubble period. Moreover, target prices of IPO firms were set at a higher premium relative to comparables during the bubble period. While our results suggest that underwriters systematically discounted offer prices during the bubble period, an alternative explanation is that the shift arose because underwriters and analysts faced different incentives and legal exposures during the bubble period.

Using a large sample of leveraged loans, we provide evidence that, despite having fewer creditor control rights, covenant-lite (Cov-Lite) loans have similar recovery rates and significantly lower spreads than loans with maintenance covenants. We find that the propensity to borrow Cov-Lite is related to various proxies for the reputational capital of a borrowing firm’s private equity sponsor. We construct a simple model to illustrate the relationship between reputational capital, covenants, and loan spreads in the leveraged loan market. Our model illustrates how reputational capital can substitute for covenants in mitigating agency costs of debt, leading to lower loan spreads for Cov-Lite loans.