Structural reforms of a fundamental nature now under way in Wall Street have been proclaimed so often of late as to become commonplace. The fact that many of these changes are not welcomed by established and influential persons who make their living in or around Wall Street is not news. What may be news, however, is that neither of these facts is particularly new.

Donald G. Simonson, Comment: The Predictive Content of some Leading Economic Indicators for Future Stock Prices, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Mar., 1974), pp. 259-261

The FTC reported 22, 517 corporate acquisitions during the 1960s compared with 7200 for the period, 1940–1959. The increased employment of this method of corporate growth has generated a number of studies explaining certain segments of the merger movement. Attempts have been made to explain why firms merge, how firms merge, and how mergers have affected subsequent performance of firms. Mergers have been described as consummated to avoid bankruptcy (for the acquired firm), to capitalize upon managerial inefficiencies, to gain from valuation discrepancies, to achieve portfolio diversification, and for synergistic purposes and many other reasons.

Weeden & Co.'s business is that of making markets. We do it in many different types of securities and we take considerable inventory risk in the process. As market makers we learn to be direct in our dealings. “My market is 62 bid; offered at 62½.” “I can offer 5,000 at 62½ net.” The pace and the pressures of the marketplace tend to make us impatient with those who speak in vague terms, who mask their intentions, or who do not know the facts.

Donald R. Chambers, Willard T. Carleton, Donald W. Waldman, A New Approach to Estimation of the Term Structure of Interest Rates, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 233-252

This paper studies the relationship between real interest rates and housing using a microeconomic approach. The primary impact of interest rates is on the demand side. The partial equilibrium, comparative static model of demand behavior presented is based on intertemporal preference maximization subject to a multiperiod income constraint. The model is always in terms of real prices and interest rates and operates in discrete time. Consumer preferences are represente by a smooth utility function which depends on two kinds of goods, housing and other nondurables. This study is couched in a neoclassical framework with all markets assumed perfect unless otherwise specified. With this approach the theory of housing and interest rates becomes part of standard consumer theory, rather than being based on inappropriate present value considerations.

Although the importance of evaluating the risk of potential investments has long been recognized, only recently have formulations been developed to include risk as an explicit variable in the decision-making process. The considerable progress being made in this area, both in theory and in application, is attested to by the number and variety of contributions to the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence on the following question: Are there more banking offices available per person to furnish consumer and business services in branch banking states than in unit banking states? This question is a central part of a broader issue of what limitations should be placed on the ability of individual banks to branch. Indeed, in a recent review of the literature dealing with the branching question, and prepared for the Senate Banking Committee (McIntyre Committee), Guttentag [8] stated: “One of the most pervasive arguments for branch banking is that branch banks provide more office facilities than unit banking.” Yet the available evidence on the question is sparse and existing research contains methodological difficulties which make the findings of questionable value.

The phenomenal growth in corporate merger activity of the 1960s revived interest in the motives and effects relating to corporate mergers. In recent years, many theories for explaining mergers have been discussed and tested in the literature of finance, law, and economics. Various authors have argued that motives for merger include increased market power [15, 21, 23], achievement of operating or managerial scale economies [2, 8], diversification [6], tax reduction [19], growth maximization [14, 16], and bankruptcy avoidance [7, 10, 12, 13]. The bankruptcy avoidance motive is perhaps the most recently articulated of all merger motives, and perhaps the only one for which no systematic attempts at empirical validation have been forthcoming.

The commercial banking industry has been buffeted by a variety of forces in recent years. Alternating periods of intense monetary restraint and the severity of the 1973–74 economic contraction (especially as it affected the real estate industry), huge losses on loan portfolios, a heavy commitment of funds to less developed countries on the part of a few major banks, and the failures of a number of individual banks have created considerable discussion about the stability of the banking system. Questions have been raised about the risk involved in committing funds to the securities of banking organizations. Moreover, the importance of these questions has been underscored for bank management by the necessity for many banking organizations to raise substantial amounts of external funds to prevent further depletion of existing capital ratios.