Many financial institutions employ outside portfolio managers to manage part or all of their investable assets. It is well recognized that outside portfolio managers are unwilling to share security information with each other or with the centralized decision maker and this in general will lead to sub-optimal portfolios. In this paper, we derive an implementable set of rules under which a central decision maker can make optimal decisions without requiring decentralized decision makers to reveal estimates of security returns. Furthermore, we derive conditions under which these rules hold and when they do not hold.

examining the reasonableness and accuracy of investment advice. Topics such as earnings estimates, security analysts recommendations, and recommendations for selecting mutual funds have been studied extensively. However, almost no attention has been paid to examining advice about the asset allocation decision (the allocation of funds across broad classes of assets). This is surprising because the asset allocation decision has been recognized as a major determinant of return and risk and because of this, advice on the optional allocation decision is provided by most brokerage firms and investment advisors Given the importance of the asset allocation decision we anticipate that the rationality of asset allocation advice will be extensively examined. The purpose of the article is two fold. First, we will examine modern portfolio theory to see what we can learn about the general characteristics of advice that are necessary for consistency with theory. Second, we will examine the advice of some specific investment advisors to see if their advice is consistent with rational behavior. We proceed in three steps. We first review some of the basic tenets of MPT, discuss alternative formulations of the problem, and examine which formulation is appropriate and

One of the major problems in finance is that of combining the separate costs of debt and equity into an appropriate cutoff rate for new investment; this problem is particularly acute when the firm is changing its capital structure. Solutions to this problem which have been proposed include various types of both marginal costing and average costing.

In testing hypotheses, researchers are almost always faced with the problem of isolating the effect of certain variables. This is a particularly acute problem in the social sciences, where the absence of an experimental environment means that researchers must resort to statistical methods of adjustment.

In this paper we show that selecting mutual funds using alpha computed from a fund’s holdings and security betas produces better future alphas than selecting funds using alpha computed from a time-series regression on fund returns. This is true whether future alphas are computed using holdings and security betas or a time-series regression on fund returns. Furthermore, we show that the more frequently the holdings data are available, the greater the benefit. This has major implications for the Securities and Exchange Commission’s recent ruling on the frequency of holdings disclosure and the information plan sponsors should collect from portfolio managers. We also explore the effect of conditioning betas on macroeconomic variables as suggested by Ferson and Schadt (1996) to identify superior-performing mutual funds as well as the alternative way of employing holdings data proposed by Grinblatt and Titman (1993).

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the errors made by professional forecasters (analysts) in estimating earnings per share for a large number of firms over a number of years. We have demonstrated in a previous paper that consensus (average) estimates of earnings per share play a key role in share price determination. In this paper, we examine consensus estimates with respect to the following questions: (1) What is the size and pattern of analysts' errors? (2) What is the source of errors? (3) Are some firms more difficult to predict than others? (4) Is there an association between errors in forecasts and divergence of analysts' estimates?

D. Chinhyung Cho, Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber, On the Robustness of the Roll and Ross Arbitrage Pricing Theory, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 1-10

Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber, Manfred W. Padberg, Simple Rules for Optimal Portfolio Selection: The Multi Group Case, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), pp. 329-345

This paper uses intraday data from the interdealer government bond market to investigate the effects of scheduled macroeconomic announcements on prices, trading volume, and bid-ask spreads. We find that 17 public news releases, as measured by the surprise in the announced quantity, have a significant impact on the price of at least one of the following instruments: a three-month bill, a two-year note, a 10-year note, and a 30-year bond. These effects vary significantly according to maturity. Public news can explain a substantial fraction of price volatility in the aftermath of announcements, and the adjustment to news generally occurs within one minute after the announcement. We document significant and persistent increases in volatility and trading volume after the announcements. Bid-ask spreads, on the other hand, widen at the time of the announcements, but then revert to normal values after five to 15 minutes. The effects that we document have relevant implications for yield curve modeling and for the microstructure of bond markets. I.

Many investors confine their mutual fund holdings to a single fund family either for simplicity or through restrictions placed by their retirement savings plan. We find evidence that mutual fund returns are more closely correlated within than between fund families. As a result, restricting investment to one fund family leads to a greater total portfolio risk than diversifying across fund families. We examine the sources of this increased correlation and find that it is due primarily to common stock holdings, but is also more generally related to families having similar exposures to economic sectors or industries. Fund families also show a propensity to focus on high or low risk strategies, which leads to a greater dispersion of risk across restricted investors. An investor considering adding an additional fund, either in the same family or outside the family, would need to believe the inside fund offered an extra 50 to 70 basis points to have the same Sharpe ratio.