Numerous studies in recent years have emphasized the importance of accounting properly for abandoment value in capital budgeting (see [1], [4], [7], [10], and [11]). For a variety of reasons, a project need be neither physically exhausted nor have negative cash flows to be abandoned. Robichek and Van Home [10] suggested that a project should be abandoned in any period in which the present value of future cash flows does not exceed its abandonment value. In a modification of this rule, Dyl and Long [4] proposed that the firm give consideration to all possible future abandonment opportunities. They argued that abandonment need not occur at the earliest possible date that the abandonment condition is satisfied, but rather at the date that yields the highest NPV over all future abandonment possibilities. A generalization of these models was offered by Bonini [1], who developed a dynamic programming model to analyze investment projects with abandonment possibilities and uncertain cash flows. More recently, Gaumnitz and Emery [7] compared the abandonment decision to the like-for-like replacement decision and noted that the correct model for a particular case depends on the suitability of the assumptions.

George M. Frankfurter, Joanne M. Hill, A Normative Approach to Pension Fund Management, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 4, Proceedings of 16th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 18-20, 1981, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Nov., 1981), pp. 533-555

The expectations theory of the term structure is well known to give wrong signals as to the future course of long-term interest rates. One explanation involves rational time-varying term premia. However, the “anomaly” may also be due to inflation forecast errors. We study survey forecasts of inflation. It seems that the respondents' forecasts are insufficiently adaptive. Interest rates reflect expectations similar to the inflation forecasts. As a result, past survey forecast errors reliably predict premia on U.S. Government Bonds.

This study examines the stock market forecasts and portfolio allocation decisions of small individual investors, based on survey data for 1987-1994. When investors are bullish, they increase their equity holdings; when investors are bearish, they decrease equity holdings. The surveyed investors are unable to time the stock market successfully. However, the shifts in their portfolios reflect past market movements and are consistent with positive feedback trading. I. Introduction There can be no doubt that, over short horizons, stock price changes are highly unpredictable. Nevertheless, many individuals discover seeming in past prices and trade based on the expectation that the trends will persist. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) call these investors positive feedback traders.

This paper investigates the relation between the form of compensation and the manager's decision horizon. It finds that while all-cash contracts induce managers to underinvest in the long term, all-stock contracts induce overinvestment in the long term. It shows that compensation contracts consisting of both cash and restricted stock can produce efficient investment, thereby providing a rationale for the existence of both cash and stock incentive schemes in executive compensation packages. This explains why the adoption of either type of incentive scheme results in a positive stock price reaction. In addition, the paper derives the following testable hypotheses: i) the proportion of the stock compensation is decreasing in the precision of the manager's ability and increasing in the precision of the firm's cash flows; ii) firms compensate their managers with proportionately more stock in profitable years and proportionately more cash in leaner years; and iii) the greater the growth opportunities, the higher the proportion of stock compensation.

Previous research has separately addressed the problem of estimating risk in the presence of infrequent trading and the problem of estimating quality-adjusted returns in markets with quality variation in the observed price series. This paper simultaneously addresses both problems by applying a signal extraction method for unequally spaced data to decompose the observed price series with varying times between transactions into a quality-adjusted, permanent component (which would be observable in the absence of quality variation) plus a stationary, transitory quality variation component. Stamp auction transaction prices provide an application. Auction quality grading is treated in a manner analogous to bond ratings. Almost all of the observed variance is attributed to the auction quality variation. The observed auction returns and stock index returns are not well related.

This paper examines the pricing of S&P 100 calls using 14 months of transactions data. We find that market prices of S&P 100 calls differ systematically from Black-Scholes values. The biases in Black-Scholes model prices are both statistically and economically significant and correspond to biases that arise if market prices incorporate a stochastically changing volatility of the index.

This paper examines multiperiod corporate financial policy in a world where the only market imperfection is taxation. The optimal financial policy determines the firm's capital structure and debt maturity structure. Two implications of this policy are: (1) there can be a set of debt-asset ratios that is consistent with firm value maximization, and (2) debt maturity structure is irrelevant to firm value.

Theodore M. Barnhill, Quality Option Profits, Switching Option Profits, and Variation Margin Costs: An Evaluation of Their Size and Impact on Treasury Bond Futures Prices, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 65-86

This paper explores the implications for the information content of acquisition offers in an economy with asymmetric information. It is shown that mergers can be socially beneficial due to risk reduction and information asymmetry even when there are no productive synergies and when positive premia are paid. The properties of equilibria with and without mergers are derived and contrasted in order to obtain a quantitative bound on potential merger premia. Theory is related to empirical evidence, where our results show that aggregate valuation gains can accrue on a purely informational basis. Moreover, the model developed here has important implications for the reported differences in tender offer and merger studies.