We compile a comprehensive international dividend and capital gains tax data set to study tax-based explanations of corporate payout for a panel of 6,035 firms from 25 countries for the period 1990–2008. We find robust evidence that the tax penalty on dividends versus capital gains corresponds closely with firms’ propensity to pay dividends and repurchase shares, and with the amount of dividends and shares repurchased. Our coefficient estimates suggest a smaller tax effect than reported in recent single-country, single-event studies. Instead, our results correspond more closely with historic long-term estimates of the elasticity of dividends.

We examine how creditor rights affect the trade-off between non-debt and debt tax shields. Using four bankruptcy reforms and a panel of private and public firms from Italy, we show that laws empowering creditors reduce tax avoidance and increase debt financing, consistent with firms substituting non-debt tax shields with debt tax shields. We corroborate the validity of our findings using a panel of public firms across 33 countries. Additionally, we document that the impact of creditor protection laws is mitigated by tax system characteristics, which significantly reduce the incentives to substitute tax avoidance with debt.

In closed-end funds, a managed distribution policy (MDP) is a dividend commitment potentially requiring the liquidation of assets. We argue that MDPs lower managerial claims on fund assets and, when the fund is at a discount, increase shareholder value. This transfer of wealth can be rationalized by managers wishing to deter a challenge from activist shareholders through a costly proxy vote. We find strong empirical evidence that managers respond to the presence of activists using MDPs, that MDPs constitute an effective wealth transfer to shareholders, and that activists are less likely to challenge management when an MDP is in place.