We explore the link between open-market share repurchases (OMRs) and asymmetric information based on financial reporting quality and find that opaque firms experience positive abnormal returns of twice the magnitude of those of transparent firms. These significant differences remain after controlling for governance, earnings management, and firm characteristics. We document significantly positive long-run postannouncement returns for opaque firms, but not for transparent firms. We find that takeover activity and premiums rise with repurchase activity by opaque firms, which may explain some of the wealth effects. Our results suggest that asymmetric information plays an important role in the wealth effects around OMRs.

We study at-the-market (ATM) equity offerings, which are direct share issuances sold in the secondary market that forgo underwriters and “dribble-out” shares over time rather than raising them all at once. Enabled in 2008, their use has increased dramatically, and in 2016, their incidence and total proceeds were, respectively, 63% and 26% of those for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Determinants of firms’ choice between ATMs and SEOs are consistent with the costly certification hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). We also find that 65% of ATM proceeds are used to stockpile cash compared to 84% of SEO proceeds.

Unlike seasoned equity or public debt offerings, bank loan financing elicits a significantly positive announcement return, which has led financial economists to characterize bank loans as “special.” Here, we find that firms announcing bank loans suffer negative abnormal stock returns over the subsequent three years. In the long run, bank loans appear no different from seasoned equity offerings or public debt issues. Our evidence suggests that larger loans (relative to borrower equity) are followed by worse stock performance. We also find that lender protection is negatively related to borrower performance, suggesting the lender is somewhat shielded from the poor performance.

In a model of dual-agency problems where borrower–lender and bank–nonbank incentives may conflict, we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness. As bank participation declines, covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold, at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in spread. We find support for the hockey stick relation with bank’s stake in covenant-lite loans averaging 8% (0% median). We also find that covenant-lite loans are more likely when borrower moral hazard is less severe and when bank relationship rents are high.