Bank regulators tend to disagree with the idea that markets can play a role in bank regulation. The markets for bank securities are viewed by regulators as inefficient and lacking the necessary information to demand sufficient risk premiums on bank obligations to affect bank management decisions. On the other hand, bankers who have an active market for their securities tend to place faith in market assessments to determine the cost of management policies; therefore, they tend to think that the market plays an important role in “regulating” bank management decisions. The regulators are perhaps correct about the markets for small and medium–sized banks, but for those banks which have an active market for their securities, do investors adjust rates of return for the presence of increased potential of bankruptcy? If so, when does the adjustment take place?

Richard H. Pettway, The Effects of Large Bank Failures Upon Investors' Risk Cognizance in the Commercial Banking Industry, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 465-477

Solving capital budgeting problems with linear and integer programming has been part of the finance literature for some time [21, 22, 23, 7, 14, and 18]. Capital budgeting problems have unique properties that distinguish them from other integer linear problems discussed in the mathematical programming literature. Capital budgeting problems generally have the following characteristics: (1) the matrix tends to be rectangular with more variables than constraints; (2) they are all maximization problems with ≤ constraints and nonnegativity conditions in the general form 0≤xi≤1 in the case of linear programming and xi = 0, 1 in the case of integer problems; and (3) there are often mutually exclusive projects among the variables. The purposes of this note are to illustrate some computational experience using existing integer algorithms to solve a set of capital budgeting problems and to begin to catalog the performance of integer codes on financial problems.