As an operational objective for firm management, the market value maximization criterion derives its theoretical validity from the Fisherian separation principle which states that production decisions for an economy can be made without regard to consumer-investors' preferences for consumption, given perfectly competitive markets. In other words, if the firm's activities do not affect the prices of consumptive goods, then maximizing the wealth of its shareholders will lead to a maximization of each shareholder's utility. Not only does this optimality criterion avoid the ambiguities and vagaries of constructing an aggregate shareholder preference function, but when implemented as a firm decision rule, should result in the same production plan that each investor would select himself, and thereby should represent a Pareto optimal allocation of resources: (Hirshleifer [5, Chapters 1, 9]; Fama and Miller [3, Chapters 2, 7]; and more recently, Ekern and Wilson [2], Merton-Subrahmanyam [7], LeRoy [6]).

Considerable literature in the investment, growth, and financing of the corporation has developed in recent years. While theoretical studies in this area have contributed importantly to the understanding of the firm's time-optimal decision program, they have generally been limited in scope to the all-internally-funded firm and steady-state dynamics. The well-known analyses of Gordon ]7[ and Lintner ]13[ are typical of this restricted focus. Herein we relax these specializing conditions, both by permitting external equity as a financing alternative and by not a priori requiring the firm to make identical (earnings proportional) investment and financing decisions at every time instant such that it progresses only along a constant, exponentially growing earnings path.

There are two well-known distinct aspects to the behavior of a risk-averse individual towards a risky proposition: the position he takes, long or short, with regard to the gamble, and the scale of the position taken–the amount by which he goes long or short. On one hand, the first aspect depends only on the individual's assessment of the expected return from the gamble relative to a safe return. The second aspect, on the other hand, will be influenced by the individual's degree of risk aversion and the level of risk of the gamble.