A number of studies of U.S. stock returns document what is referred to as the investment or asset growth effect. Specifically, firms that increase investment or total assets subsequently earn lower risk-adjusted returns. This study finds substantial cross-country differences in the asset growth effect. In particular, the asset growth effect is stronger in countries with more developed financial markets, but it does not seem to be associated with corporate governance or the costs of trading. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a q-theory where financial market development captures either managers’ willingness or ability to align investment expenditures to the cost of capital, but it is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the asset growth effect is due to bad governance and overinvestment.

In this article, we evaluate the effect of managerial entrenchment on corporate information production using the voting outcomes of shareholder-initiated proposals intended to mitigate managerial entrenchment. We focus on the proposals that are passed or rejected by a small margin of votes, which generate plausibly exogenous variations in managerial entrenchment. We find that a reduction in managerial entrenchment enhances corporate information production. The effects are stronger for firms with greater information asymmetries and severer agency frictions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that reducing managerial entrenchment enhances corporate disclosure by aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders.

This paper investigates the relation between ownership structure and firm value across a sample of 5,284 firm years of China's partially privatized former state–owned enterprises (SOE) from 1991–2001. We find that state and institutional shares are significantly negatively related to Tobin's Q, and that significant convex relations exist between Q and state shares, as well as between Q and institutional shares. We also find that foreign ownership is significantly positively related to Tobin's Q. We test for potential endogeneity of ownership, and find that Q and state/foreign ownership are not jointly determined. We also test for time-series, industry, and geo-economic location effects, and find our results to be robust.

Firms that substantially increase capital investments subsequently achieve negative benchmark-adjusted returns. The negative abnormal capital investment/return relation is shown to be stronger for firms that have greater investment discretion, i.e., firms with higher cash flows and lower debt ratios, and is shown to be significant only in time periods when hostile takeovers were less prevalent. These observations are consistent with the hypothesis that investors tend to underreact to the empire building implications of increased investment expenditures. Although firms that increase capital investments tend to have high past returns and often issue equity, the negative abnormal capital investment/return relation is independent of the previously documented long-term return reversal and secondary equity issue anomalies.