Knowledge that Transforms

We provide theoretical and empirical analyses of an asymmetric-information model of layoffs. When firms have discretion with respect to whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off workers are of low ability. Assuming that no such negative inference is warranted if workers are displaced in a plant closing, postdisplacement wages should be lower and postdisplacement unemployment spells should be longer for those displaced by layoffs than for those displaced by plant closings, but predisplacement wages should not differ by cause of displacement. Evidence on displaced workers from Current Population Surveys supports all three of our model's predictions.

This article examines a model of "semiefficient" bargaining in which the union and the firm bargain over wages and various types of work rules. The results are compared to the outcomes that are associated with fully efficient bargaining (i.e., over wages and the level of employment) and bargaining solely over wages.

This article investigates the effect of external, national, and sectoral shocks on Canadian employment fluctuations at the national, industrial, and provincial levels. We assume that employment growth in each industry-province pair depends on U.S. growth, lagged Canadian growth at the national, industrial, and provincial levels, an aggregate shock, and shocks specific to each industry, province, and industry-province pair. We estimate that the U.s. and Canadian shocks account for two-thirds and a quarter, respectively, of aggregate variation. Sectoral shocks account for only one-tenth of aggregate variation but represent 30% of the variation from Canadian sources.

This article investigates cyclicality in real wages between 1969 and 1982, using Panel Study of Income Dynamics data. There is little evidence that movements in and out of the labor market induced aggregate wage cyclicality during these years. However, cyclicality in the movement of workers between heterogeneous labor-market sectors affected aggregate wage cyclicality. While sector location is important, sector selectivity is not correlated with wages. Yet, even within sectors, cyclicality is present in real wages over this time period and is the result of cyclicality in overall wage levels, as well as in the coefficients associated with particular worker characteristics.

There is much variation in the union/nonunion wage gap across groups of workers within each of the two sectors, public and private. Furthermore, the variation in the public sector does not parallel in all of its detail that in the private sector. Thus, though the public-sector gaps typically are somewhat below their private-sector counterparts, there are important exceptions to this difference, especially among employees of local governments: public school teachers, clerical workers, refuse collectors, local transit bus drivers, licensed practical nurses, hospital technicians, nonprofessional hospital workers, and undoubtedly some others.

The "job-stopping" process of older workers often includes some combination of postcareer "bridge" employment, partial retirement, and reverse retirement. Fewer than two-fifths of household heads retire directly from career jobs, over half partially retire at some point in their working lives, and a quarter reenter the labor force after initially retiring. In addition, postcareer employment is frequently located outside the industry and occupation of the career job, and there are important differences in postcareer labor force experiences by gender, permanent income, and career-job pension status.

"The seven-fold increase, since 1920, in the labor force participation rate of married women [in the United States] was not accompanied by a substantial increase in average work experience among employed married women. Two data sets giving life-cycle labor-force histories for cohorts of women born from the 1880s to 1910s indicate considerable (unconditional) heterogeneity in labor-force participation. Employed married women had substantial attachment to their jobs; increased participation brought in women with little prior work experience. Average work experience among cross sections of employed married women increased from 9.1 to 10.5 years over the 1930-50 period. Implications for 'wage discrimination' are discussed."

Despite an extensive literature examining the effects of unions on wages, little attention has been paid to the resultant aggregate employment consequences of this change in the relative cost of unionized labor. This article uses 1983 Current Population Survey data to estimate the effects of union strength on the probability of employment and labor force participation. Union strength, which reflects both union coverage and the union wage differential, is found to decrease employment and increase unemployment by a small but significant amount. These effects are concentrated primarily among females and young males, while little impact is found on prime-age males.

The simplest economic theories of crime predict that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies of minimal monitoring with large penalties for employee crime. We investigate possible reasons why firms actually spend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance. We find that the most plausible explanations for firms' large outlays on monitoring of employees-legal restrictions on penalty clauses in contracts and the adverse impact of harsh punishment schemes on worker morale-are also consistent with the payment of premium (rent-generating) wages by cost-minimizing firms.

This article presents an empirical study of strike activity in a panel of contract negotiations for some 250 firm-and-union pairs. Evidence is presented on two sources of variation in dispute rates: changes in the characteristics of the collective bargaining agreement that affect subsequent strike outcomes and the effects of lagged strikes on the incidence and duration of subsequent disputes. Strike probabilities are significantly affected by the duration and expiration month of the previous agreement. Dispute rates are also increased by the occurrence of a short strike during the previous negotiations and reduced by the occurrence of a long strike.