Knowledge that Transforms

"The seven-fold increase, since 1920, in the labor force participation rate of married women [in the United States] was not accompanied by a substantial increase in average work experience among employed married women. Two data sets giving life-cycle labor-force histories for cohorts of women born from the 1880s to 1910s indicate considerable (unconditional) heterogeneity in labor-force participation. Employed married women had substantial attachment to their jobs; increased participation brought in women with little prior work experience. Average work experience among cross sections of employed married women increased from 9.1 to 10.5 years over the 1930-50 period. Implications for 'wage discrimination' are discussed."

Despite an extensive literature examining the effects of unions on wages, little attention has been paid to the resultant aggregate employment consequences of this change in the relative cost of unionized labor. This article uses 1983 Current Population Survey data to estimate the effects of union strength on the probability of employment and labor force participation. Union strength, which reflects both union coverage and the union wage differential, is found to decrease employment and increase unemployment by a small but significant amount. These effects are concentrated primarily among females and young males, while little impact is found on prime-age males.

The simplest economic theories of crime predict that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies of minimal monitoring with large penalties for employee crime. We investigate possible reasons why firms actually spend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance. We find that the most plausible explanations for firms' large outlays on monitoring of employees-legal restrictions on penalty clauses in contracts and the adverse impact of harsh punishment schemes on worker morale-are also consistent with the payment of premium (rent-generating) wages by cost-minimizing firms.