Knowledge that Transforms

A review of previous analyses of labor supply effects of Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) concludes that estimates of labor supply effects and net social costs are upward biased because they ignore interactions between DI and other insurances. A model of optimal insurance, postinjury accommodations, and labor supply shows that reduction in labor supply and increase in consumption when disabled do not necessarily imply moral hazard. Optimal postinjury accommodations vary inversely with firm size. The Americans with Disabilities Act will reduce wages and labor supply of healthy workers, particularly in small firms. Effects on labor supply of the disabled are ambiguous.

This article argues that the negative relationship between weekly hours worked and the gross hourly wage rate is due to the provision of fringe benefits. As the total weekly wage increases, employers and employees avoid taxation by substituting wages with nontaxable, nonwage benefits. I produce a wage that incorporates the benefit effects and estimate the corresponding labor-supply elasticities. An estimator is presented for the wage/hours market locus and the structural labor-supply function. An empirical application indicates that an estimated negative labor-supply elasticity associated with the observed gross wage is reversed when the adjusted wage is employed.