Knowledge that Transforms

The failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court-mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female-headed households. This paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children's welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce. The point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother. Within marriage, proximity and altruism serve to overcome the "free-rider" problem associated with the provision of public goods. However, on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a Pareto-optimal allocation of their joint resources. A model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event of divorce. The settlement consists of the determination of custody and transfer of income to the custodial parent. Divorce is endogenous in our model and its occurrence depends on a random variable introduced into the family budget constraint that measures the quality of the marriage match. The analysis yields several useful insights. In addition to explaining the apparently insufficient support by custodians we explain why custody rights and alimony transfers often go in the same direction, most commonly to the wife, and why uneven distribution of income between the spouses increases the probability of divorce.

The term "added worker effect" usually refers to a temporary increase in the labor supply of married women whose husbands have become unemployed. This paper presents a new approach to the empirical study of the added worker effect, which emphasizes the role of employment uncertainty and credit constraints in generating short-run participation and employment patterns. The estimates are based on employment transition probabilities rather than static measures of labor supply and are used in a dynamic simulation of changes in the employment and participation rates of wives following an exogenous increase in unemployment among their husbands. The results show a small but significant added worker effect, at least for white families, and suggest that the apparent disagreement among previous studies may stem from different approaches to measuring responses to a transitory event such as an unemployment spell.

This paper reexamines the empirical basis for two "facts" that seem to be found in most cross-section studies of immigrant earnings: (1) the earnings of immigrants grow rapidly as they assimilate into the United States; and (2) this rapid growth leads to many immigrants' overtaking the earnings of the natives within 10-15 years after immigration. Using the 1970 and 1980 U.S. censuses, this paper studies the earnings growth experienced by specific immigrant cohorts during the period 1970-80. It is found that within-cohort growth is significantly smaller than the growth predicted by cross-section regressions for most immigrant groups. This differential is consistent with the hypothesis that there has been a secular decline in the "quality" of immigrants admitted to the United States.

Increasing returns from specialized human capital is a powerful force creating a division of labor in the allocation of time and investments in human capital between married men and married women. Moreover, since child care and housework are more effort intensive than leisure and other household activities, married women spend less effort on each hour of market work than married men working the same number of hours. Hence, married women have lower hourly earnings than married men with the same market human capital, and they economize on the effort expended on market work by seeking less demanding jobs. The responsibility of married women for child care and housework has major implications for earnings and occupational differences between men and women.

This paper examines how measurement error biases longitudinal estimates of union effects. It develops numerical examples, statistical models, and econometric estimates which indicate that measurement error is a major problem in longitudinal data sets, so that longitudinal analyses do not provide the research panacea for determining the effects of unionism (or other economic forces) some have suggested. There are three major findings:

Participants in labor market experiments are aware that the experiments run for a limited amount of time. Thus behavior during a temporary experiment will be different than if the experimental change in constraints confronting participants were permanent. In evaluating changes in policy, however, the response to permanent changes is of primary interest. The paper analyzes conditions under which permanent responses can be inferred from data on temporary experiments.

This paper formulates and estimates a model for the determination of employer and union demand for multiemployer (vs. single employer) bargaining units. Utility-maximizing, risk-averse firms and unions are both assumed to weigh the impact of each type of bargaining unit on the expected level and variability of profits and wages, respectively. The model is tested on a 1975 sample of 3,486 individual collective bargaining agreements. Because either party can generally leave a multiemployer unit without the other party's consent, a partially observed bivariate probit model is used to estimate demand for structure. It is found that the forgone profits due to a multiemployer unit (relative to a single-firm unit) lower firm demands for this type of unit, while forgone wages in a multiemployer unit (relative to a single-firm unit) lower union demand for this type of unit.

Affirmative action under Executive Order 11246 ranks among the most controversial of domestic federal policies. This study asks whether affirmative action has been successful in promoting the employment of minorities and females. It compares the change in demographics between 1974 and 1980 at more than sixty-eight thousand establishments, and finds that both minority and female employment have increased faster at establishments subject to affirmative action. Compliance reviews, while not well targeted are also found to have been effective.