Controlling for cognitive skills, we find that men who occupied leadership positions in high school earn more as adults. The pure leadership‐wage effect varies, depending on definitions and time period, from 4% to 33%. This effect is not an artifact of measurement error in cognitive skills or differences in a wide array of other physical or psychological traits. High school leaders are more likely to occupy managerial occupations as adults, and leadership skills command a higher wage premium within managerial occupations than elsewhere. Finally, it appears that leadership skills may be fostered by exposure to high school leadership opportunities.

In contrast to nonunion workers, reemployment wages of workers displaced from unionized jobs decline with tenure on the lost job. This finding cannot easily be explained by firm‐ or industry‐specific human capital accumulation, deferred‐pay policies, standard matching models, or a correlation between tenure and reentry rates into unionized jobs. Possible explanations include negative selection of senior union workers and a negative causal effect of unionism on workers' alternative skills. Despite a much flatter predisplacement tenure‐wage profile, displaced union workers' wage losses increase with tenure at a rate comparable to or higher than those of nonunion workers.

In labor markets, the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance pay choose to restrict their output, because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond to higher output levels by raising output requirements or by cutting pay. We model this effect as a multiperiod principal-agent problem with hidden information and study its robustness to labor market competition both theoretically and experimentally. Consistent with our theoretical model, we observe substantial ratchet effects in the absence of competition, which are nearly eliminated when competition is introduced; this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor firms or workers.