I investigate how the relationship between the wage and the length of the work day has changed since the 1890s among prime‐aged men and women. I find that across wage deciles, within wage deciles, and within industry and occupation groups, the most highly paid worked fewer hours than the lowest paid in the 1890s but that by 1973 differences in hours worked were small and by 1991 the highest paid worked the longest day. I examine several explanations for the compression in the length of the work day and investigate the implications of hours inequality for earnings inequality.

Estimated negative substitution effects on work hours question the empirical validity of the classical labor supply model. Estimates are reconciled by allowing a dual choice of hours and effort for piecerate workers. In such a model, these negative substitution effects result from substituting on‐ and off‐the‐job leisure. We test our model using controlled experimentation on human subjects. These experiments, while not naturally occurring environments, represent real economic choices and can generate data unavailable elsewhere (e.g., effort data). The results support our model, and they have implications both for labor management and for empirical research focusing only on the hours choice.

Over the years there have been frequent changes in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Such changes could influence spells in progress as well as future spells. If individuals anticipate changes, they are likely to adjust their behavior. The effect of changes in benefits on unemployment duration, therefore, will be difficult to predict accurately without accounting for individual expectations. This article investigates the extent to which individuals anticipate changes in UI entitlement. The results suggest that individuals have significant, although not perfect, foresight about changes in UI provisions. Assuming perfect foresight might represent actual expectations more closely than assuming no foresight.

The classic case of nonconvexity in consumer opportunities is that of labor supply. While most studies of labor supply concentrate on the individual agent in partial equilibrium, this study considers general equilibrium. I show that even with nonconvex consumer opportunites, such as those involved in the labor supply decision, the standard theorems of general equilibrium models still hold.

The 1918–47 employee records of the Ford Motor Company provide a rare opportunity to study a firm willing to hire black workers when similar firms would not. The evidence suggests that Ford did profit from discrimination elsewhere, but not by paying blacks less than whites. An apparent “wage‐equity constraint” prevailed, resulting in virtually no racial variation in wages inside Ford. An implication was that blacks quit Ford jobs less often than whites, holding working conditions constant. Arbitrage profit came from exploiting this nonwage margin, as Ford placed blacks in hot, dangerous foundry jobs where quit rates were generally high.

Jurisdictions across the United States have adopted “ban the box” (BTB) policies preventing employers from asking about job applicants’ criminal records until late in the hiring process. Their goal is to improve employment outcomes for those with criminal records, with a secondary goal of reducing racial disparities in employment. However, removing criminal history information could increase statistical discrimination against demographic groups that include more ex-offenders. We use variation in the timing of BTB policies to test BTB’s effects on employment. We find that BTB policies decrease the probability of employment by 3.4 percentage points (5.1%) for young, low-skilled black men.

This study explores corporate responses to 1993 legislation that capped the corporate tax deductibility of top management compensation not qualified as “performance‐based.” Our analysis suggests that the cap may have created a focal point for salary compensation but had little effect on total compensation levels or growth rates at firms likely to be affected by the limit. There is little evidence that the policy significantly increased the performance sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) pay at affected firms. We conclude that corporate pay decisions have been relatively insulated from this policy intervention.

Jobs with performance-related pay (PRP) attract workers of higher ability and induce workers to provide greater effort. The authors construct an integrated model of effort and sorting that clarifies the distinction between observable and unobservable ability and the relationship between earnings and productivity. Predictions are tested against data from the British Household Panel Survey. The PRP raises wages by 9 percent for men and 6 percent for women. Theoretical calculations show that these estimated earnings differentials represent average productivity differentials net of monitoring costs at the marginal firm using PRP but not of the disutility of additional effort expended by workers. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.

The government has attempted to ameliorate gaps in college access and success by providing need-based grants, but little evidence exists on the long-term impacts of such aid. We examine the effects of the Florida Student Access Grant (FSAG) using a regression-discontinuity strategy and exploiting the cut-off used to determine eligibility. We find that grant eligibility had a positive effect on attendance, particularly at public 4-year institutions. Moreover, FSAG increased the rate of credit accumulation and bachelor’s degree completion within 6 years, with a 22% increase for students near the eligibility cut-off. The effects are robust to sensitivity analysis.

Workers in cities earn 33% more than their nonurban counterparts. A large amount of evidence suggests that this premium is not just the result of higher ability workers living in cities, which means that cities make workers more productive. Evidence on migrants and the cross effect between urban status and experience implies that a significant fraction of the urban wage premium accrues to workers over time and stays with them when they leave cities. Therefore, a portion of the urban wage premium is a wage growth, not a wage level, effect. This evidence suggests that cities speed the accumulation of human capital. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.