Knowledge that Transforms

I study workers' incentives to invest in general human capital (education) in the presence of search‐induced unemployment. Workers queue for jobs, and firms prefer to hire the most productive applicants because of rent sharing. As a result, an unemployed worker's ranking relative to other job seekers will influence his job‐finding rate. This creates a “rat race,” where workers invest in education partly in order to achieve a better ranking. In equilibrium, identical workers may have incentives to diversify in terms of education, and the investments in education may exceed the socially optimal level.

This article provides evidence on changes in short‐term job instability and insecurity using the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Monthly measures from this data set are contrasted with annual measures from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Neither data set shows an increase in job turnover during the 1980s and 1990s. We also examine indicators of increased insecurity. These include the probability that a job ends involuntarily, is followed by a spell of nonemployment, or that the subsequent job has lower wages. These indicators of insecurity also show no upward trend.

Estimated negative substitution effects on work hours question the empirical validity of the classical labor supply model. Estimates are reconciled by allowing a dual choice of hours and effort for piecerate workers. In such a model, these negative substitution effects result from substituting on‐ and off‐the‐job leisure. We test our model using controlled experimentation on human subjects. These experiments, while not naturally occurring environments, represent real economic choices and can generate data unavailable elsewhere (e.g., effort data). The results support our model, and they have implications both for labor management and for empirical research focusing only on the hours choice.

I examine the extent to which workers who lose jobs obtain work in alternative employment arrangements, including temporary work and independent contracting, and obtain voluntary or involuntary part‐time work. I find that job losers are significantly more likely than nonlosers to be in both temporary jobs (including on‐call work and contract work) and involuntarily part‐time jobs. I also find evidence that temporary and involuntary part‐time jobs are part of a transitional process subsequent to job loss leading to regular full‐time employment.

This article attempts to determine whether wage records reported by employers to state unemployment insurance (UI) agencies provide a valid alternative to more costly retrospective sample surveys of individuals as the basis for measuring the impacts of employment and training programs for low‐income persons. We analyze UI data and survey data for a sample of low‐income adults and youths from 12 sites in the National Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) study. Our comparison indicates that impact estimates based on UI data and survey data were usually comparable. However, average surveyreported earnings were higher than average UI‐reported earnings.

This article defines and analyzes job security in the context of implicit contracts designed to overcome incentive problems in the employment relationship. Contracts of this nature generate predictions concerning the relationship between job security parameters—such as worker seniority and sectoral economic conditions—and the probability of separations. To test these predictions, I estimate binomial and multinomial models of job separations using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data for the years 1976‐93. The results are consistent with a decline over time in the incentives to maintain existing employment relationships for male workers and for skilled white‐collar women.

We study the effect of new technologies (NT) on wages and employment using a unique panel that matches data on individuals and on their firms. As in the United States, we show that computer users are better paid than nonusers (15%–20% more). But these workers were already better compensated before the introduction of the NTs. Total returns to computer use amount to 2%. Measurement errors do not affect our estimates. Furthermore, computer users are protected from job losses as long as bad business conditions do not last too long. This result holds even after controlling for possible selection biases.

We estimate interindustry wage differentials using new French longitudinal data that allow a tracking of workers and their firms over time. We find that, when measured on a cross‐sectional basis, they primarily reflect the interindustry variations in unmeasured labor quality. However, interindustry wage differentials are only a minor component of interfirm wage differentials. The average differential in wages paid to the same workers by different firms is about 20%–30%. In a given industry, wage policies are more favorable to workers in large, capital‐intensive firms.

In recent years, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, former U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, and many journalists have argued that workers are more anxious about losing their jobs than they were in the past. I use the 1977‐96 General Social Survey to document trends in workers' beliefs about their own job security. During the 1990s, workers have been more pessimistic about losing their jobs in the next 12 months than workers were during the 1980s. Workers have also been more concerned about suffering future job loss that would have resulted in a decline in earnings or a spell of unemployment.

This article compares immigrant and native‐born male occupational distributions in Canada in the 1980s. Three questions are addressed: (1) How do immigrant and native‐born occupational distributions differ? (2) Are immigrants more occupationally mobile? and (3) How do immigrant occupations and mobility relate to characteristics used in immigrant selection? Results indicate that immigrants are more skilled, but this declines across successive cohorts. Immigrants are more occupationally mobile even long after arrival, indicating immigration may contribute to a more flexible labor force. Immigrants who are not assessed on their skills or are not fluent at arrival are less occupationally mobile.