This article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high-wage (good) and low-wage (bad) jobs coexist. Minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high-wage jobs. Because the composition of jobs in the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low-wage jobs, these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare.

In February 1995 Continental Airlines introduced an incentive scheme that promised monthly bonuses to all 35,000 hourly employees if the company achieved a firm-wide performance goal. Conventional wisdom suggests that free riding will render such schemes ineffective. We present evidence indicating that the incentive scheme raised employee performance despite the apparent threat of free riding. To explain why the scheme may have been effective we argue that the organization of employees into autonomous work groups enabled Continental to induce mutual monitoring among employees within each work group

Studies have suggested that urban agglomeration enhances productivity by facilitating the firm‐worker matching process. This article develops a model that formalizes this notion and demonstrates that, when firm capital and worker skill are complementary in production, urban agglomeration will tend to generate more efficient, yet segregated matches. As a result, not only will local market size be positively associated with average productivity, it will also generate greater between‐skill‐group wage inequality and a higher expected return to skill acquisition. Recent data from the counties and metropolitan areas of the United States is consistent with each of these implications.

Should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should the rate decline (or increase) over a worker’s unemployment spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment. The model features worker‐firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining benefit sequence over the spell of unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there may be nontrivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system.

Theory predicts that minimum wages will reduce employer‐provided on‐the‐job training designed to improve workers' skills on the current job, but it is ambiguous regarding training that workers obtain to qualify for a job. We estimate the effects of minimum wages on both types of training received by young workers, exploiting cross‐state variation in minimum wage increases. Much of the evidence supports the hypothesis that higher minimum wages reduce formal training to improve skills on the current job. But there is little or no evidence of offsetting increases in training undertaken to qualify for or obtain jobs.

Why do countries that impose employer sanctions to deter the illegal entry of foreign workers nevertheless grant amnesty to illegal immigrants? In this article, I provide a positive theory of amnesty provision in a model where the constrained optimal immigration reform, involving the joint use of employer sanctions and border interdictions, is time‐inconsistent. In particular, my framework demonstrates that host countries of immigration can enhance the credibility of their immigration reforms by “binding their own hands” and strategically granting a socially excessive amount of amnesty to illegal workers.

The assumption of constant returns in the matching function, embodied in most bilateral search models, is crucial to ensure the uniqueness of the unemployment rate along a steady‐state growth path. This article explores the empirical viability of this assumption by estimating individual reemployment probabilities on a sample of unemployment entrants. I apply hazard models to survey data on both completed and uncompleted unemployment durations. The hypothesis of constant returns to matching is not rejected, on the basis of the evidence that the job‐finding hazard depends only on local labor market tightness and is independent of its size.

A large literature attempts to explain compensation and personnel policies in large organizations. Three features of the U.S. military system—flat rank spreads in pay, a relatively generous pension, and heavy reliance on up‐or‐out promotions—are at variance with common practices in large civilian organizations. This article develops a model of individual decision making in a large, hierarchical organization and uses the model to explain these apparent puzzles. The lack of lateral entry and heterogeneity in entrants’ abilities and preferences for military service play key roles in the observed policies.

In a world in which employment contracts are incomplete, it is costly for a firm to establish credibility for honoring implicit terms of employment agreements. By monitoring the employment relationships between the firm and its workers, the labor union may provide the workforce with valuable information regarding the firm's adherence to these implicit agreements. Thus, the union provides a signaling mechanism that allows workers to coordinate their actions in order to discipline the firm for a breach of the implicit contract. This mechanism enhances the firm's credibility when forming employment contracts and facilitates increased employment levels.

We conduct an experimental analysis of final offer arbitration (FOA) with differentially informed players. Under FOA, the arbitrator must choose one of the two submitted offers. In our control, the uninformed player makes an offer to the informed player prior to the submission of offers to the arbitrator. The treatment allows negotiation after offers are submitted to the arbitrator. Because these offers are potentially binding, they may transmit privately held information and, thereby, lower the dispute rate. We find that allowing negotiation in the face of potentially binding offers lowers the dispute rate by 27 percentage points.