Using March Current Population Survey data, we investigate married women’s labor supply from 1980 to 2000. We find a large rightward shift in their labor supply function for annual hours in the 1980s, with little shift in the 1990s. These shifts account for most of the slowdown in the growth of labor supply during this period. A major development was the dramatic decrease in the responsiveness of married women’s labor supply to their own and husbands’ wages: their own wage elasticity fell by 50%–56%, while their cross wage elasticity fell by 38%–47% in absolute value.

We study worker behavior in an efficiency‐wage environment in which coworkers’ wages can influence a worker’s effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers’ responsiveness to coworkers’ wages should lead profit‐maximizing firms to compress wages. Our laboratory experiments, by contrast, show that while workers’ effort choices are highly sensitive to their own wages, effort is not affected by coworkers’ wages. This casts doubt on the notion that workers’ concerns with equity might explain pay policies such as wage compression or wage secrecy.

Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we test Costa and Kahn’s colocation hypothesis, which predicts that power couples—couples in which both spouses have college degrees—are more likely to migrate to the largest cities than part‐power couples or power singles. We find no support for this hypothesis. Instead, regression analyses suggest that only the education of the husband and not the joint education profile of the couple affects the propensity to migrate to large metropolitan areas. The observed location trends are better explained by higher rates of power couple formation in larger metropolitan areas.

We study the economics of employment relationships in large law firms. Our point of departure is the “property‐rights” approach that emphasizes the centrality of ownership’s legal rights to control significant nonhuman assets of the enterprise. From this perspective, law firms are an interesting object of study because the key asset in these firms is knowledge, particularly knowledge of the needs and interests of clients. We argue that two distinctive organizational features of law firms—the use of “up‐or‐out” promotion contests and the practice of having winners become residual claimants in the firm—emerge naturally in this setting.

This article brings together the market for products, the market for talent, and firms’ organizational form. While the organizational design determines the allocation of blame and fame within the firm, the value of a good reputation depends on the market structure. Consequently, the market structure dictates the optimal organizational design. If competition becomes tougher and the market thicker, transparent firms decentralize while nontransparent firms concentrate control, transparency itself is improved, corporations switch from unitary to multidivisional form, and the turnover of managers increases. The model rationalizes recent trends in both executive pay and organizational design.

We model team formation as a random matching process influenced by agents’ preferences for team size and gender composition. We then test if the coauthorship pattern in articles published during 1991–2002 in three top economics journals is gender neutral, exploiting variation in female presence across subfields. Controlling for author, team, and field characteristics, we find that the gender gap in the propensity to coauthor with a woman increases in the presence of women in the subfield. We also find that women single author significantly more than men. These findings allow us to reject gender neutrality in team formation in economics.