This paper investigates marriage market equilibrium when bargaining in marriage (BIM) determines allocation within marriage. In contrast, the standard marriage market model assumes that prospective spouses make binding agreements in the marriage market (BAMM) that determine allocation within marriage. When BIM determines allocation within marriage, the appropriate framework for analyzing marriage market equilibrium is the Gale-Shapley matching model, not the Koopmans-Beckmann-Shapley-Shubik assignment model. BIM and BAMM have different implications not only for allocation within marriage but also for who marries, who marries whom, the number of marriages, and the Pareto efficiency of marriage market equilibrium.

Since 2000, US real average wages stagnated or declined while Canadian wages increased. We investigate the role of the Canadian resource boom in explaining this difference. We focus on wage spillovers to nonresource workers through a bargaining channel. We find that long-distance commuting to resource regions had substantial spillover effects on noncommuters in sending regions. Through spillovers, we account for 49% of the increase in the real mean wage in Canada between 2000 and 2012. We also find long-distance commuting effects in the United States. We conclude that long-distance commuting integrates regions, spreading benefits and costs of booms across the economy.