Volunteer activity is work performed without monetary recompense. This article shows that volunteering is a sizeable economic activity in the United States, that volunteers have high skills and opportunity costs of time, that standard labor supply explanations of volunteering account for only a minor part of volunteer behavior, and that many volunteer only when requested to do so. This suggests that volunteering is a "conscience good or activity"-something that people feel morally obligated to do when asked, but which they would just as soon let someone else do.

Prior theoretical work predicts an underprovision of advance-notice contracts stemming from their enforcement costs. In the present model, it is rather the fundamental inability of workers to alienate their right to quit taken in conjunction with parameters central to job separation decisions that jointly determine the mix of notice and no-notice contracts observed in equilibrium. Not all equilibrium contracts are efficient, but there is no underprovision of notice. Mandating notice cannot improve on joint value and indeed may reduce it. Furthermore, although a mandate can be merely redistributive, there are cases in which it harms all parties.