This article examines a model of "semiefficient" bargaining in which the union and the firm bargain over wages and various types of work rules. The results are compared to the outcomes that are associated with fully efficient bargaining (i.e., over wages and the level of employment) and bargaining solely over wages.

Who should pay the resource costs of higher education? This paper investigates a simple model of the general equilibrium of the labor market with three skill levels. Those in the population with the lower level of intelligence and/or sophistication can only become low-skilled workers, but the brighter segment of the population can become either high- or medium-skilled workers. Given the tax structure, the welfare of each group is maximized by a unique subsidy rate on the cost of training high-skilled workers. Under several circumstances, the lower IQ group wants a higher subsidy rate than will the group that benefits directly from the training.

We assess changing patterns of migration and their association with labor outcomes for the 1979 and 1997 cohorts of the NLSY. Although the long-distance migration rate is lower in the 1997 cohort, we find that migration fell mostly because return migration fell. We uncover little difference in patterns of selection into migration in the two cohorts, little difference in correlation between migration and labor market outcomes, and little evidence in either cohort of a positive labor market return to migration. Our findings suggest that reductions in geographic mobility do not explain the poor recent labor market performance of young adults.