A growing literature uses random assignment of cases to judges to examine criminal sentencing. To extend this line of work, we directly examine how judicial “harshness” varies with the seriousness of criminal conviction. Using a model that respects the mix of cases and the noise produced by small caseloads, we find that case severity is best viewed as an endogenous outcome of bargaining. We also find that harsher judges have a higher share of cases failing to reach a plea bargain, but perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence that large jumps in expected incarceration lead to differential plea bargain outcomes.

We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high-level positions. Labor market quotas create uncertainty about the reason a woman is promoted. Firms know whether they promoted female employees because of the quota or their ability; their competitors do not. A winner’s curse, reducing competition for women in high-level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap for these women. Ex ante, women are better off without quotas. Next we investigate how quotas affect incentives for employers to learn women’s abilities to make better job assignment decisions. Then, under specific conditions women may benefit.

We use administrative payroll data to estimate the effect of the minimum wage on employment and wages. We find that both effects are nuanced. While the overall number of low-wage workers in firms declines, incumbent workers are no less likely to remain employed. We find that firms reduce employment primarily through hiring, and there is significant heterogeneity across the nontradable and tradable sectors. For wages, we find modest spillovers extending up to $2.50 above the minimum wage. Spillovers accrue to both incumbent workers and new hires, but only within firms that employ a significant fraction of low-wage workers.