This article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker’s productivity than potential employers. Previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers, the latter use job assignment to infer an employed worker’s qualifications. As a result, assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient. I find that when current employers can match outside offers, the equilibrium outcome may be efficient. I analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers, and find these investment levels to be first best.

In this article, we examine optimal job choices when jobs differ in the rate at which they reveal information about workers’ skills. We then analyze how the optimal level of experimentation changes over a worker’s career and characterize job transitions and wage growth over the life cycle. Using the Dictionary of Occupational Titles merged with the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, we then construct an index of how much information different occupations reveal about workers’ skills and document patterns of occupational choice and wage growth that are consistent with a trade-off between information and wages.

Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation. We find, controlling for executive rank and background, that women earn higher compensation than men, experience more income uncertainty, and are promoted more quickly. Among survivors, being female increases the chance of becoming chief executive officer. The unconditional gender pay gap and job-rank differences are primarily attributable to female executives exiting the occupation at higher rates than men.