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The Labor Supply of Married Men: A Switching Regressions Model

Journal of Labor Economics 1987 5(1), 63-75
According to the family utility function approach, the labor supply functions of married men should differ according to whether their wives also work. In this paper, I explicitly model the switching nature of labor supply while also accounting for the endogeneity of the labor force participation decision of the wife, using an endogenous switching regressions model based on the quadratic family utility function. The model is estimated from a cross section of 1,210 married couples from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

New Market Power Models and Sex Differences in Pay

Journal of Labor Economics 2010 28(2), 267-289
In the context of certain models, it is possible to infer the elasticity of labor supply to the firm from the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the wage. We use this strategy to estimate the elasticity of labor supply for men and women workers at a chain of grocery stores, identifying separation elasticities from differences in wages and separation rates across different job titles within the firm. We estimate that women have lower elasticities, so a Robinson‐style monopsony model can explain reasonably well the lower relative pay of women in the retail grocery industry.

Estimating the Firm’s Labor Supply Curve in a “New Monopsony” Framework: Schoolteachers in Missouri

Journal of Labor Economics 2010 28(2), 331-355 open access
In the context of certain dynamic models, it is possible to infer the elasticity of labor supply to the firm from the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the wage. Using this property, we estimate the average labor supply elasticity to public school districts in Missouri. We leverage the plausibly exogenous variation in prenegotiated district salary schedules to instrument for actual salary. These estimates imply a labor supply elasticity of about 3.7, suggesting that school districts possess significant market power. The presence of monopsony power in this teacher labor market may be partially explained by its institutional features.