In this article we document the patterns of employment adjustment at the micro level. We find clear evidence of lumpy adjustment consistent with the presence of nonconvexities in the adjustment technology—inaction is pervasive, action spells are short‐lived, and extreme adjustment episodes are responsible for a nontrivial share of employment adjustment. We also find that the probability of employment adjustment increases with the duration of inaction. The skill structure of the workforce, the type of employment contract, and the proportion of low‐tenure workers, which we interpret as proxies for the magnitude of adjustment costs, all influence the probability of adjustment.

How does a typically European bargaining system, with collective bargaining and national minimum wage, coexist with low unemployment and high wage flexibility? A unique data set on workers, firms, and collective bargaining contracts in Portugal is used to analyze the determinants of both the contractual wage and the wage cushion (difference between contractual and actual wages). The results indicate that the wage cushion stretches the returns to worker and firm attributes, whereas it shrinks the returns to union power. Therefore, firm‐specific arrangements partly offset collective bargaining, granting firms certain freedom when setting wages. Contractual wages reflect trade unions' egalitarian policy.

Using special CPS data on displaced workers, this article investigates the wage consequences of job displacement in a framework that emphasizes the effects of past job duration(s) and unemployment duration(s) on postdisplacement wages. Our model also attempts to take account of the simultaneity between unemployment duration and the postdisplacement wage. It is found that duration strongly reduces subsequent earnings and that considerable overstatement of the loss in firm-specific training investments is implied by conventional routes to measuring wage losses.